Essays in Experimental Economics by Zhou, Xiaoyu
Essays in Experimental Economics
Submitted by
Xiaoyu Zhou
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the
Royal Holloway, University of London
2016
Declaration
I, Xiaoyu Zhou, hereby declare that Chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis are my own
research work. Chapters 3 and 4 comprise of collaborative research. Chapter 3 was
conducted in collaboration with Dr. Michael Naef and Dr. Christoph Eisenegger.
My contribution to this paper consists discussing and refining the research question,
designing and coding the experiment, analyzing the data, and writing up the paper.
Chapter 4 was conducted in collaboration with Dr. Michael Naef and Dr. Bjoern
Hartig. My contribution to this paper consists discussing and refining the research
question, designing and coding the experiment, running the experiment, analyzing
the data, and writing up the paper.
Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Xiaoyu Zhou)
Date:
1
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays which utilize experimental methods to address
different questions in the field of economics. The second chapter is related to the
field of cultural economics, it investigates whether rice cultivation that practiced
hundreds of years ago give rise to a cooperative social norm that has profound and
long lasting effects on individual’s behavior in an incentivized and strategic setting.
The second chapter investigates whether testosterone leads to reputation enhancing
prosocial behavior in the context of charitable donations, which is related to the
field of neuroeconomics. In the forth and final chapter, we aim to disentangle the
effect of two distinct aspects of reputation concern, namely, pursuit of honor and
avoidance of shame, on charitable behavior.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays which utilize experimental methods to address
different questions in the field of economics. Chapters 3 and 4 are related as they
both investigate people’s behavior in the context of charitable donations. Chapter 2
aims to explore the origins of the observed differences in the level of cooperative-
ness across societies and countries, which contributes to the literature of culture
economics and hence is unrelated to the other two chapters.
Chapter 2 aims to explore the origins of observed differences in cooperativeness
across societies and cultures. In particular, the paper shows that rice cultivation
practiced hundreds of years ago gives rise to a more cooperative social norm that
affects contemporary decision making in a incentivized and strategic setting. The
rationale behind this finding is that unlike cultivating other crops, such as wheat or
corn, farming rice historically required extensive cooperation among farmers. There-
fore, hundreds of years of rice farming might lead to the creation of a cooperative
social norm that affects people living in that society, and the social norm transmits
fairly unchanged from generation to generation. To test this hypothesis, I travelled
to four typical rice and non-rice provinces in China and recruited a total of 524 local
university students as subjects. The results indicate that rice subjects contribute
more than their non-rice counterparts in the Public Goods Game with and without
punishment, with the effect being a lot more pronounced in the former. Further
analyses reveal a significant difference in frequency, though not in magnitude of
punishment. There is no difference in how the two groups react to punishment. It
follows that the different level of cooperativeness observed in the punishment treat-
ments is a direct effect of the significant differences in frequency of punishment.
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Furthermore, as there is no difference between the two groups in the ultimatum and
in the dictator game, the interpretation of the results is that rice cultivation does
not make people more cooperative per se. Instead, it is more likely the case that
people in rice regions understand the nature of public goods differently than their
non-rice counterparts. I attribute the differences to a cultural norm resulting from
a history of farming that affects the whole population living in that society.
Chapter 3 investigates whether testosterone leads to prosocial behavior in the
context of charitable donations. Researches in the field of psychology and neuro-
science have established that testosterone’s main role in human social interaction is
to promote dominance behavior, that is, actions to maintain high status in situa-
tions where individuals face challenges from others. In this paper, we take a step
forward by investigating whether testosterone leads to reputation enhancing behav-
ior in absence of status threats. In a real effort donation experiment, a single dose
of 0.5 mg of testosterone or placebo was applied sublingually in a randomized and
double-blind fashion. The results indicate that there is no significant behavioral
differences between the testosterone and placebo group, which is inconsistent with
our hypotheses. We argue that three factors, namely, all female subjects, real effort
task too enjoyable, and lack of observations are the main reasons of why we find
null results.
In the forth and final chapter, we aim to disentangle the effect of two distinct
aspects of reputation concern on charitable behavior. It is well established that rep-
utation concern is one important motivation underlying charitable behavior. How-
ever, less is know whether it is the pursuit of honor, avoidance of shame, or the
combination of both that drive people’s behavior. These two motives are separated
in a carefully designed donation experiment. The results indicate that both the de-
sire to gain prestige and the urge to avoid social disapproval are important motives
in explaining giving behavior.
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Chapter 2
Rice Farming and the Emergence
of Cooperative Behavior
2.1 Introduction
Studies have documented that people’s level of cooperativeness differs across coun-
tries and societies.1 However, the reason that these differences exist remains an open
question. Understanding the factors that make people more cooperative is impor-
tant, as the level of cooperation is associated with economic and political outcomes
such as economic development (Knack and Keefer, 1997) as well as norms of civic
cooperation and rules of law (Herrmann et al., 2008).
In this paper, we show that traditional agricultural activity practiced hundreds
of years ago gives rise to a cooperative social norm that persists over generations and
has profound influence on people’s behavior in an incentivized and strategic setting.
The agricultural activity refers to rice cultivation. Two features of rice farming
distinguish itself from other crops, such as wheat and corn. First, rice grows on
standing water instead of dry land, and farmers in a village traditionally share the
same water reserves. This resulted in the need to cooperate in the management of
the common resource and in the maintenance of the irrigation system. In addition,
rice farming requires a large amount of labour. Farmers first need to grow rice
1See Herrmann et al. (2008) and Henrich et al. (2006) for differences in punish behavior in the
Public Goods Game (PGG), Ga¨chter et al. (2010) and Ga¨chter and Herrmann (2009) for differences
in cooperation in the PGG, and Jackson and Xing (2014) for different behaviors in the coordination
game.
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seedlings in separate lands and then transplant rice seedlings into paddy fields. This
necessitated a large amount of labour. Indeed, agricultural anthropologists conclude
that the amount of labour required in rice cultivation is at least twice as the number
needed in farming wheat (Buck, 1935). Therefore, families with a only a few labor
forces will not be able to survive if they rely on rice farming (Hsiao-Tung and Chih-i,
1945). To solve the shortage of labour supply during farming and harvesting seasons,
farmers in rice villages form cooperative labour exchanges. Farmers also summon
their relatives who live in neighbor villages to deal with the labour shortage issue.
In sum, farming rice historically requires extensive cooperation among farmers, and
the hypothesis is that centuries of rice farming leads to a cooperative social norm
that is intergenerational transmittable.
To test this hypothesis, we travelled to typical rice and non-rice provinces in
China and conducted lab experiments at local universities. We believe that China
is a perfect testbed for the rice theory. Agriculture has been the most important
industry throughout China’s history. During China’s imperial era, most of the
population was farmers.2 Even in 2011, about 34.8% of China’s population was
employed in the agriculture sector (World Bank). More importantly, China also has
a long history of rice cultivation (Fan, 2007).
Following Talhelm et al. (2014), the categorization of rice and non-rice regions is
based on the proportion of cultivated land devoted to rice paddy fields. We use the
earliest available data from the National Bureau of Statistics website, because we
do not want the farming statistics be affected by recent advances in technologies,
but rather to reflect, as closely as possible, the historical farming choice. Indeed,
the two rice provinces in our sample have been prominent rice production provinces
since Song Dynasty (960 – 1279) (Fan, 2007).
We recruited local, Han Chinese, first year university students based on their
Hukou. Hukou is a household registration system employed in China. The policy
requires that individuals must register the Hukou at their city of residence and they
can only register their Hukou at one city. By local students we mean that their
Hukou was registered at the province of experiment. For example, if the experiment
was conducted in Hebei, which is a typical non-rice province, subjects with Hebei
Hukou were recruited.3
2See “A Brief History of China’s Economy” edited by Fudan University and Shanghai University
of Finance and Economics (1982)
3Please see to the experimental section for a detail discussion of the recruitment criteria and
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To measure the difference of cooperativeness between rice and non-rice subjects,
we implemented the Public Goods Game (PGG) with and without punishment.
Moreover, in order to gain a deeper insight of the rice and non-rice difference, we
also asked subjects to participate in a dictator game (DG), an ultimatum game
(UG), and a coordination game. We also implemented a priming treatment in half
of the sessions in which we simply informed subjects that they were from the same
province (please see the experimental design section for details). Results suggest
that priming has no effect on subject’s behavior in the experimental tasks and we
therefore pool the data for analyses.
There are several important features of our experimental design worth mention-
ing. First and foremost, subjects were not farmers but university students who had
minimal farming experiences.4 Therefore, the present study goes beyond merely
testing the effect of rice farming on individual’s cooperativeness. Instead, we aim
to investigate whether hundreds of years of rice farming is capable of creating a co-
operative social norm that affects everyone in the society and that transmits fairly
unchanged from generation to generation. Second, we travelled to the selected rice
and non-rice provinces and conducted the experiments locally. We believe that the
sample in our study is more representative and has less selection issues than studies
that conduct experiments in one Beijing University and recruit students from all over
China in that university.5 The reason is that Beijing universities set small quotas
for students from provinces other than Beijing, therefore, non-Beijing students who
intend to study in Beijing face stronger competition. Consequently, the majority of
high school graduates choose local universities. Third, by recruiting Han Chinese
University students, a number of potential confounds are controlled by design, such
as educational background, language, culture, and political institution. And last,
we have a relatively rich data set that allows us to link individuals to administrative
data such as their Hukou type (Rural or Urban) and the local GDP measure.
We find that rice subjects contribute more than non-rice subjects in both the
PGGs with and without punishment. In the no punishment condition, although
rice subject’s contribution is higher, the difference is relatively weak. Rice subjects
also experience a stronger end game effect, as the contribution unravels to the same
their advantages.
4See the experiment design section for a discussion of why this is the case.
5A large proportion of subjects in Talhelm et al. (2014) were recruited in Beijing
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level as non-rice subjects in the last period. To the contrary, the difference in con-
tribution is substantial in the punishment condition. Rice subject’s contribution
is already significantly higher than non-rice in the first period. More importantly,
the difference not only sustains but also enlarges towards the end. We also find
that rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders compared to their non-rice
counterparts and there is no difference in the intensity of punishment conditional
on punishing. Additionally, the two groups do not differ in how they respond to
punishment. It follows that the different levels of cooperativeness observed in the
punishment condition is a direct consequence of the significant differences in punish-
ment behavior. Furthermore, as there is no difference between the two groups in the
ultimatum game and in the dictator game, we interpret from our results that rice
cultivation does not make people more cooperative per se. Instead, it is more likely
the case that people in rice regions understand the nature of public goods differently
than their non-rice counterparts. And last, we run a series of robustness checks and
show that the conclusions are less likely driven by self-selection and omitted variable
bias.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that shows agriculture
activities that practiced hundreds of years ago have a long lasting and profound effect
on individual’s level of cooperativeness and punishment behavior in a incentivized
and strategic setting. The paper most related to ours is Talhelm et al. (2014), who
found that people from rice and wheat areas in China have different thinking styles,
measured by the Triad task.6 However, unlike Talhelm et al. (2014), we focus our
attention on economically relevant behavior in incentivized and strategic situations.
We also administrated the Triad task and find no difference between the rice and
non-rice subjects in our sample. More importantly, our results are not attenuated
by controlling for the thinking style. This suggests that our results are mediated
from a different channel other than thinking styles. The methodological difference
is that we used validated and incentivized games from the experimental economics
literature, while they used non-incentivized questionnaires.
This research contributes to the emerging literature that aims to explore the
origins of the observed differences in people’s preferences across societies. Alesina
6We use the rice and non-rice terminology instead of rice and wheat. This is because in addi-
tional to wheat, there are other types of crops that require less cooperation to farm, such as corn.
Note that the categorization of rice and non-rice provinces is exactly the same as rice and wheat.
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et al. (2013) investigates the origins of cross-cultural differences in norms about
gender roles. They find that societies which historically practice plough agriculture
has less equal gender norms in the work place. The rationale behind this observation
is that plough requires considerable level of upper body strength, hence, men have a
relative advantage to women in workplace in those societies. Galor and O¨zak (2016)
find that participation in agricultural activities affects people’s time preferences. In
particular, the higher but delayed return feature of the agriculture sector makes
people more future orientated. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that the level of
mistrust within Africa origins from the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades.
The present paper differs from the aforementioned papers in three important
ways. First and foremost, we focus on explaining the origins of cross cultural dif-
ferences in the level of cooperativeness, while they focus on gender norms, time
preferences, and trust. Second, their measures mainly come from surveys, while in
our data, subject’s cooperativeness is elicited in an incentivized and strategic set-
ting. And last, we believe that we have a more direct approach to show that our
results are less likely driven by self-selection. In particular, we are able to identify
the subjects in our sample who had migrated into or out of rice farming regions,
and we show that our findings are not affected by the exclusion of these subjects.
There is also a small but emerging literature that utilize lab or lab-in-the field ex-
periments to explore the observed differences in preferences across countries. Gneezy
et al. (2016) and Leibbrandt et al. (2013) find that sea fishermen are more cooper-
ative and less competitive than lake fishermen. They argue that this is because the
difference in work place organization between the two groups: sea fishing requires
intensive team work among crew members in order to survive in the sea, while lake
fishing is usually an individual activity. However, they do not find any behavioral
differences among women in the two societies who do not fish, and they conclude
that “... suggestive evidence that norms of cooperation learnt at the workplace
do not spread to other society members” (Gneezy et al., 2016, p. 2). This is in
sharp contrast to our finding because subjects in our experiment are all university
students who have minimal farming experience. In a related paper, Carpenter and
Seki (2006) also find evidence supporting the idea that work place organization has
profound influences on cooperation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 illustrates the
experimental design. Non-parametric and regression results are presented in sec-
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tion 2.3. A series of robustness checks are conducted in section 2.4. Section 2.5
discusses the findings, and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
The idea of the design is to compare subjects who have similar backgrounds but
live in regions that differ sharply in the type of cultivation. The most important
feature of our design is that the subjects were university students instead of farm-
ers. Thus, the present paper aims to investigate whether rice farming is capable of
creating a cooperative social norm that transmits fairly unchanged from generation
to generation.
2.2.1 Province selection
We conducted lab experiments in four universities that are located in four provinces
across China. By restricting the sample to Chinese subjects, a number of potential
confounds are controlled by design, such as language, political institution, and other
cross country cultural differences.
Since we are investigating the intergenerational transmission of social norm cre-
ated by rice farming hundreds of years ago, the categorization of rice and non-rice
provinces should be based on the type of crops farmers historically cultivate. For
this purpose, we use the earliest available cultivation data (1996) on the Bureau of
Statistics Web site.7 Following Talhelm et al. (2014), a province is classified as rice
if more than half of its cultivated land is devoted to rice paddy field. The two rice
provinces we choose are Hunan and Zhejiang province, which devote more than 78%
of the cultivated lands to paddy fields. Also note that these two provinces has been
prominent rice farming provinces since Song Dynasty (Fan, 2007). The percentage
is less than 2.5% in the non-rice provinces: Hebei and Shandong.
2.2.2 Subject Recruitment
We recruited local, Han, first year university students. We believe that our subjects
have minimal farming experiences. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, about 40% of
7http://www.stats.gov.cn
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the subjects in our sample hold an urban Hukou which implies that they do not have
the legal right to possess farming lands.8 Second, since high schools are generally
located in larger cities, commuting between school and home might be too costly,
in terms of time and money, for students who have a rural Hukou. Therefore,
they might choose to live on campus during school days and hence do not have
much farming experience. One might argue that they can help their families during
weekends or holidays. However, we doubt this limited time of farming experience
is able to modify their behavior. In addition, rice cultivation nowadays probably
requires less cooperation due to advances in technology, therefore, even if subjects
spend sufficient time in rice farming, the norms of cooperation in the field might
not be strong enough to alter their behavior. Thus, if there is any difference in
cooperation between rice and non-rice subjects, it is unlikely due to their personal
farming experiences but the intergeneration transmission of social noms related to
the crops that used to be predominantly cultivated in their regions.
We recruited local university students for three important reasons. First, this
reduces the chance of recruiting subjects from less typical provinces. For example,
in Sichuan and Jiangsu province, the percentage of farming land devoted to rice
and non-rice crops are very close between each other. Second, since reciprocity is
an important motivation in the PGGs (Fischbacher et al., 2001), behavioral norms
might be hard to emerge if rice and non-rice subjects interact. And third, having a
local Hukou suggests that the subject has more likely been living in the area for a
long time and hence is more affected by the social norm.9
We chose Han Chinese because Wen et al. (2004) discovers that Han Chinese
have the same culture origin. We also recruited first year students because they
had just graduated from high school. Chinese high schools have a busy schedule:
students stayed in classroom more than seven hours every day and study similar
materials. Therefore, subjects had similar experience prior to university. Moreover,
first year students are free from the indoctrination effect of their field of study.10
8According to China’s Hukou policy, people with Rural Hukou are entitled with farming land.
9When analyzing the data, we find that a few subject’s Hukou was not from the province of
experiment. In order to utilized as many observations as possible, we drop subjects whose Hukou
was from a different farming province. For example, if the experiment was conducted in rice
provinces, we drop subjects who had Hukou from non-rice farming provinces. The results are the
same if we drop subjects whose Hukou province was different from the experiment province. Please
note that in the latter case, more observations are dropped.
10There were 9 subjects who were not first year students. Including or excluding them do not
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The recruitment process was the following. A list of qualified students was
provided by each university, and we randomly drew subjects from the list. Selected
subjects were then contacted by the administrative staffs of each university. We
provided a script about how to recruit the students. We emphasized that it was
a economic study, they would receive money payments to compensate for their
time, their decisions in the study would be anonymous and would not affect their
records related to university in any way, and most importantly, participation was
not compulsory.
2.2.3 Experimental Games
To compare the level of cooperation between rice and non-rice areas, we conducted
a repeated public goods game (PGG) with and without punishment. We believe
that the situation farmers encounters everyday is very similar to the situation in the
PGG: each farmer has the incentive to free-rider on other farmers during planting
or harvesting seasons. However, the society reaches the most efficient outcome if all
farmers exert maximum effort.
Subjects first played eight periods under the no punishment condition followed
by eight periods of punishment condition. They knew that there would be another
game after the no punishment condition, but they were not informed about its
content until the no punishment condition was completed.
In the no punishment condition, subjects are randomly divided into groups of
four and the group composition is fixed throughout the eight periods. In each
period, each subject has an endowment of 20 points and is asked to decide how
many points to contribute to a group account (the remaining points are allocated
to their individual account). The total points in the group account are multiplied
by 1.6 and then evenly distributed among all group members. In particular, each
subject face the following payoff function:
ui = (20 − ci) + (1.6 ∗
4∑
j=1
cj) / 4
in which ui is i’s payoff, ci is i’s contribution to the group account, and
∑4
j=1 cj is
the sum of contribution made by all group members.
affect our results and hence we include them in the analyses.
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Note that the contributor only gains 0.4 points for each point contributed to
the group account. Therefore, contributing nothing always give subjects the highest
material payoff regardless of other group member’s contribution. On the other
hand, each point contributed to the group account increases the payoff of the whole
group by 1.6 points, and hence the group level payoff is highest if all group members
contribute 20 points. In the latter case, each subject earns 32 points, which is higher
than the self interested outcome, 20 points.
After all subjects make their decisions, the amount of contribution of each sub-
ject, their earning from the group account, and their total earning in the current
period are shown on their computer screen. The contribution of each group member
is randomly displayed on the computer screen in each period, therefore, subjects
cannot associate contribution with a particular group member.11 Subjects need to
press the ‘CONTINUE’ button to proceed to the next round.
After the no punishment condition, subjects randomly regrouped and play eight
periods of the punishment condition. The first part of the punishment condition
is the same as the no punishment condition: each subject has an endowment of
20 points and need to decide how many points to contribute to a group account.
After this decision is made, subjects are informed about their earnings from the first
stage and are asked to proceed to punishment stage, in which subjects can assign
punishment tokens to other group members. In the punishment stage, other group
members’ contributions in the present period are displayed on subject’s computer
screen. Based on this information, subjects can assign punishment tokens, which are
restricted between zero and ten inclusive, to other group members. Each punishment
token costs one point to the punisher and reduces the earnings of the punished
subject by three points.12 Next is the information display stage in which subjects’
final earnings are shown. They are informed about their earnings in the first stage,
total punishment tokens received and total punishment tokens assigned to others in
the punishment stage, and their final earnings. Please note that subjects only know
the total punishment tokens received but not who assigned the punishment.
11Other group members’ contribution are displayed because subjects are also asked to play the
PGG with punishment, in which case group members’ contributions must be revealed. We intend
to make the design of the two games as close as possible.
12Subjects are informed that their earning can only be reduced to zero no matter how many
punishment tokens they receive. However, negative earning is possible if ones earning is reduced
to zero due to receiving too many punishment tokens and she also assigns punishment tokens to
others. This design is also used in Herrmann et al. (2008).
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In order to gain a deeper insight of the rice and non-rice difference, we also asked
subjects to participate in a dictator game (DG), an ultimatum game (UG), and a
coordination game (Stag Hunt).
In the dictator game, subjects are randomly assigned to the role of proposers or
responders. Proposers have to decide how to divide a total of 60 points between
themselves and a randomly matched, anonymous responder. When the task starts,
responders are asked to state how many points they expect to receive. Please note
that responders’ answers will not affect the outcome of the dictator game, and the
proposers are not informed about this.13
Subjects’ roles in the ultimatum game are the same as in the dictator game,
but they are randomly regrouped. The difference between the ultimatum game and
the dictator game is that in the former, responders have the power to reject or
accept offers made by proposers. We employed a minimal acceptable offer (MAO)
method. When proposers are making offers, responders simultaneously state their
minimal acceptable amount. If the offer made by the proposer is lower than the
minimal acceptable amount, the allocation is automatically rejected, in which case
both of them earn nothing. If the offer is larger or equal to the minimal acceptable
amount, the proposal is automatically accepted, in which case both of them receive
the amount according the division. Subject’s role in the DG and UG was fixed
because this design allows us to investigate whether rice and non-rice subjects have
different level of strategic consideration. Since the responder can reject an offer in
the UG while has no influence in the DG, strategic individuals should offer nothing
in the DG and offer a higher amount in the UG. Therefore, the difference in the
offer amount in the UG and DG is a measure of strategic behavior. Results suggest
that there is not difference between rice and non-rice in this regard.
The stag hunt game is a two-player simultaneous move coordination game. The
payoff matrix is presented in table 2.1. Subjects can choose between hunting a stag
or a hare. Stag is harder to catch but more valuable. Both players need to choose
the same action to make the hunt successful. If they mis-coordinate, the one who
choose stag will fail and hence obtain the lowest payoff. Hare, on the other hand, is
easy to catch and is therefore a safe choice: it yields a payoff of 22 points regardless
of other player’s action.
13This is accomplished by displaying the information on responders computer screen after the
DG starts.
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Table 2.1: Payoff matrix of the Stag Hunt Game
Subjects’ risk attitudes are elicited using the Holt and Laury type lotteries (Holt
and Laury, 2002). They are informed that this task is not incentivized. We also
implement the triad task, which is the main dependent variable in Talhelm et al.
(2014). The Triad task is designed to measure people’s thinking styles. The ques-
tionnaire presents subjects with a list of three objects, and subjects are asked to
choose the two items that they think are more related to each other. For example,
one of the questions is panda, banana, and monkey. Panda and monkey is an ana-
lytic choice because they are both animals. On the other hand, monkey and banana
is a holistic choice since monkey eats banana. Rice and non-rice subjects in our
sample do not differ in the level of thinking styles.
Since the literature in psychology suggests that collective societies value group
membership, we conduct a priming treatment in half of the sessions. The procedure
is simple. In Hebei for example, after all subjects arrived in the lab and were waiting
for instructions, the experimenter stated: please note that all of you are from Hebei
province.14 In the other sessions, subjects are not informed about this information.
We find that priming has no effect on subject’s behavior, we therefore pool the data
from priming and no-priming sessions in the analyses.
2.2.4 Experimental Procedure
After all subjects arrived in the lab and prior to getting any instructions of the
study, they were asked to sign a formal consent. Participants knew that each session
consists several parts, but they did not know the content of the future parts until
the corresponding instructions were provided.
The order of the experimental tasks was organized as follows. First, subjects
were asked to fill out a questionnaire, which consisted the nonincentivized lottery
14In some sessions, few subjects stated that they were not from the local province. In this case,
the experimenter explained that they cannot participate in the experiment and were free to leave.
Of course, the show-up fee was paid to them.
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task and the triad task. Second, they played the DG, UG, Stag Hunt game, the
PGG no punishment condition, and the PGG punishment condition, in that order.
After they competed a post experimental questionnaire, they received their payment
and were free to leave.
The reason we set the order of the games as previously described is that we intend
to avoid the outcome of one game to affect subject’s behavior in the subsequent
games. The DG, UG and Stag Hunt are the first three games because we can
easily withhold the outcome of these games until the very end of each session. This
is not possible in the PGGs. In the no punishment, the amount of contribution
of each group member and each subject’s earning is shown after each period. In
the punishment condition, the act of punishing or getting punished might influence
subject’s behavior, we therefore allocate the punishment condition to the last. In
sum, the order of the games aims to minimize the externality of each game on
subject’s subsequent behavior.
One of the five games was randomly selected for payment. If the PGGs were
chosen, the experimenter would draw one period out of the eight periods. Subject’s
earning were exchanged to Chinese Yuan at the rate: 1 points = 0.5 Yuan (about 8
US Cents).
The experiment was conducted between Oct 2015 and Jan 2016 in China. There
were a total of 524 subjects. 116 subjects for Hebei province, 156 subjects in
Shandong province, 128 subjects in Hunan province and 124 subjects in Zhejiang
province. We ran 6 sessions per province. All the sessions were conducted on Sat-
urdays and Sundays because student’s schedule was busy during weekdays. Each
session lasted about 2 hours. Subjects earned on average 30 Yuan (about 5 US dol-
lars), including a 15 Yuan show-up fee. Subjects’ earnings were similar to China’s
minimal hourly wage.15
2.3 Experimental Results
If the tradition of rice farming has resulted in the creation of a more cooperative
social norm and this norm is transmittable from generation to generation, one should
15See Appendix A for the experimental instructions. Please note that the instructions are in
English, as they were used for a pilot session conducted in Royal Holloway, University of London.
Moreover, we abandoned the sliding bar in the DG, UG, and PGGs for the sessions in China.
Input boxes were used instead. The Chinese version is available upon request.
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observe that subjects from rice farming provinces contribute more than subjects from
non-rice provinces in the public goods games. This is exactly what we find. The
following result summarizes the findings in the PGG without punishment.
Result 1. In the PGG without punishment, rice subject’s contribution is higher
than non-rice subject’s contribution. However, the difference does not sustain in the
last period.
Support for result 1 is presented in figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution
of average contribution over time. In the no punishment condition (periods 1 - 8),
the average contribution over the eight periods is 10.70 and 9.63 points for rice
and non-rice regions respectively. The difference is marginally significant (Mann-
Whitney U test, each group as an independent observation: p = 0.0657).16
Although the difference in average contribution between rice and non-rice sub-
jects in the no punishment condition is only marginally significant, the difference in
the pattern of contribution over time is dramatic. Rice and non-rice subjects start
at similar level of contribution in the first period (Mann-whitney U test, each group
as an independent observation: p = 0.0937). Difference begins to emerge over time.
Contribution of non-rice subjects increases modestly over interaction. In contrast,
rice subjects manage to increase contribution dramatically. However, rice subjects
also experience a stronger end game effect, as the contribution unravels to the same
level as non-rice subjects in the last period (Mann-whitney U test, each group as an
independent observation: p > 0.66).17
The different contribution pattern between rice and non-rice is also confirmed in
the random effects panel regression showed in table 2.2. Both the Period and Period
Squared are highly significant, suggesting that the contribution pattern of non-
rice subjects exhibits a inverted-U shape. The interaction terms between the Rice
dummy and the period terms are also signifiant, which implies that rice subject’s
contribution pattern has more curvature.
16We use group level average and conduct statistical tests based on group level to control for with-
in group dependency. However, the group level average is not exactly the same as the individual
level average due to the fact that some subjects are dropped from the analyses. Please note that
the results do not change if we conduct Bootstrapped ttest on group level clusters.
17The difference in contribution between rice and non-rice in the PGG without punishment
becomes significant if the last period is excluded because of the strong end game effect (Mann-
Whitney U test, each group as an independent observation: p = 0.0458).
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Figure 2.1: Average contribution in each period in PGG and PGG with Punishment
Notes: The x-axis is period number and y-axis is the average contribution. Periods 1-8 are public goods game
without punishment. After period 8, subjects randomly regroup and play another eights rounds of public goods
game with punishment (periods 9-16).
The stronger end game effect of rice subjects compared to non-rice subjects sug-
gests that rice farming might not make people more cooperative per se, instead, it
might be the case that people from rice areas understand the public goods situa-
tion differently than non-rice subjects. In other words, they understand that it is
profitable to contribute to the public good so long as there are future interactions.
If it is indeed the case that rice subjects are more familiar with the public good
situation, one should expect the difference in contribution between rice and non-rice
is more substantial in the punishment condition, since punishment has proven to
be highly effective in fostering cooperation (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Masclet et al.,
2003). Subject’s behavior in the PGG with punishment is summarized in result 2.
Result 2. In PGG with punishment, rice subject’s contribution is significantly
higher than non-rice subject’s contribution. The difference is already significant
in the first period and enlarges towards the end.
The evidence of result 2 is presented in period 9-16 of figure 2.1. The average
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Table 2.2: Random Effects Panel Regression about the different contribution pat-
terns in rice and non-rice provinces
(1)
Rice -0.292 (0.535)
Period 0.827*** (0.208)
Rice x period 0.761** (0.337)
Period squared -0.105*** (0.0215)
Rice x period squared -0.0810** (0.0342)
Constant 8.588*** (0.348)
Observations 4136
Notes: The regression is a random effects panel regression. The dependent variable is the contribution in the no
punishment condition. There are 4136 observations, which implies 517 subjects are included in the analysis. As
mentioned previously, 7 out of 524 subjects are dropped from the analyses because they come from a province that
the main type of crop is different from the province of experiment. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
contribution over the eight periods is 11.90 points for non-rice and 13.40 points for
rice; the difference is significant (Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an indepen-
dent observation: p = 0.02). Note that the difference in contribution is already
significant in the first period (Mann-Whitney U test, each group as an independent
observation: p = 0.02). In the presence of punishment opportunities, the difference
not only sustains but also enlarges towards the end, which is in stark contrast to
the no-punishment condition.
One important feature of figure 2.1 is that for both rice and non-rice subjects, the
contribution increases sharply from the no-punishment condition to the punishment
condition. We elaborate on this observation in more detail in the following.
Result 3. The presence of punishment opportunity significantly increases contribu-
tion for both rice and non-rice subjects. Moreover, punishment has a slightly stronger
effect for rice subjects.
Non-rice subjects on average contribute 9.63 points in the no punishment condi-
tion. This number increases to 11.87 in the presence of punishment. The difference,
2.24 points, is highly significant. For rice subjects, the increment is 2.73 and is also
highly significant (Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests: p < 0.01 for both rice and non-rice
subjects).18 The results also suggest that punishment has a stronger effect for rice
subjects. The difference in contribution between the no-punishment and punishment
18Since subjects randomly regroup after the no-punishment condition, it is impossible to conduct
paired tests based on the group level. Therefore, these two tests are based on individual level.
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condition is larger for rice subjects, and it is marginally significant (Mann-Whitney
U test: p = 0.0572).
In the following, we investigate subject’s punishment behavior. We are inter-
ested in how subjects punish each group member instead of the sum of punishment
points assigned to all group members in each period. We also distinguish between
prosocial and anti-social punishment. Prosocial punishment is defined as assigning
punishment points to subjects who contribute less than the punisher. We label
this behavior pro-social punishment because the punisher is willing to sacrifice her
own payoff to punish free-riders, and free-riders who receive punishment are more
likely to increase their contribution in following periods (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000;
Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008). Therefore, pro-social
punishment is beneficial to the whole group. Anti-social punishment is defined as
punishing group members that contribute more than or equal to the punisher. This
behavior is labelled anti-social punishment because the punished subject behaved
more pro-socially than the punisher and this behavior detrimental to the group’s
payoff (Herrmann et al., 2008).
Distinguishing between pro-social and anti-social punishment is important be-
cause individuals have different punishment behavior towards free-riders and coop-
erators (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), and this is a common practice in the literature.19.
Result 4a. Rice subjects make significantly more pro-social punishments than non-
rice subjects. There is no difference in antisocial punishment.
Result 4b. Further analyses of the data suggest that rice subjects are significantly
more likely to punish free-riders, there is no difference in the intensity of punishment
conditional on punishing free-riders.
Evidence for Result 4.a is provided in figure 2.2. Figure 2.2 depicts the average
punishment points assigned to others as a function of deviation from the punisher’s
contribution. For example, the [-20,-10) category implies that the punished subject
contributes from 10 to 20 points less than the punisher. Therefore, all the categories
to the left of [0] are pro-social punishment, and all the other categories are anti-
social punishment. The results confirm that rice subjects assign significantly more
punishment points to free-riders. The difference is significant for categories [-10, -5)
19See (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Anderson and
Putterman, 2006; Faillo et al., 2013; Herrmann et al., 2008)
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and [-5, 0) (Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.01 for [-10,-5) and p = 0.02 for [-5,0)) and
is weakly significant for the [-20,-10) category (Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.08). If
we merge all the three free-riding categories into one category, the difference between
rice and non-rice becomes highly significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.01). On
the other hand, there is no significant difference between rice and non-rice areas in
the anti-social categories (Mann-Whitney U test: p > 0.22 for all relevant categories:
[0], (0, 5], (5, 10], and (10, 20]).20
The punishment pattern in figure 2.2 also suggests the necessity to separate
prosocial and anti-social punishment. As shown in the figure, for pro-social pun-
ishment, the amount of punishment point assigned is positively associated with the
size of free-riding. This association, however, is much weaker when the punisher
contributes more than the punished subject.
Figure 2.2: Punishment Behavior
Notes: This figure shows how subjects punish those who contribute less, more, or equal to themselves. The x-axis
shows the difference between ones own contribution and one of her group member’s contribution. For example, [-20,
-10) implies one of my group member’s contribution is from 10 to 20 points less than my contribution. The y-axis
is the average punishment point subjects assigned to each category.
20If we merge all the four positive deviation categories into one category, the difference between
rice and non-rice becomes only weakly significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.08).
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Additionally, we find that the percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice farm-
ing also predicts pro-social punishment among rice regions; there is no such rela-
tionship among non-rice regions. (see table A.1 in Appendix A.2. Columns 1-2 are
for rice regions; columns 3-4 are for non-rice regions).
Evidence supporting Result 4.b is presented in table 2.3. Columns 1-3 of table 2.3
show that rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders in comparison to their
non-rice counterparts (we use the Random effects Linear Probability Model for the
ease of presentation, the results are the same under the Random Effects Probit
model). In column 1, the Rice dummy is positive and significant at 10% level
(it is highly significant in the Random Effects Probit Model), confirming that rice
subjects are more likely to punish free-riders. The Anti-Social Punishment variable
is significantly negative, which means that non-rice subjects are significantly less
likely to punish cooperators.
Following Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2014) we also controlled for the punisher’s con-
tribution and the punished subject’s contribution (Column 2). We also controlled
for the other two group member’s average contribution. Without these controls,
one cannot claim that rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders, instead, it
might simply due to the fact that the contribution difference between the punisher
and punished subject is larger in rice areas. For example, suppose there are two
groups, A and B. The punisher in both groups contributes 15 points. In group A,
one group member contributes 5 and in group B, one group member contributes 12.
In this case, the punisher in group A are more likely to punish the free-rider simply
because the contribution difference is too large. Controlling for the punisher and
punished subject’s contribution allows one to compare the tendency to punish other
group members while holding the contribution difference constant. The reason to
include the other two group member’s average contribution is similar.
Columns 4-6 of table 2.3 shows that conditional on punishing, the intensity of
punishment does not differ between rice and non-rice subjects.21 This is true for both
anti-social punishment and pro-social punishment. In column 4, the variable Rice
is not significant, suggesting that conditional on punishing free-riders, the amount
of punishment points assigned to free-riders does not differ between rice and non-
21We used tobit model to analyze punishment points assigned to other groups members because
the amount of punishment is restricted between zero and ten inclusive. Note that the results are
the same if we use linear models.
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rice. The interaction term between Rice and Anti-Social Punishment is also not
significant. This implies that there is no difference in the intensity of anti-social
punishment conditional on performing an anti-social punishment. The results are
the same if we control for the contribution level of other group members (column
5).
Result 5. There is no difference between rice and non-rice in how subjects respond
to punishment.
Table 2.4 demonstrates the results on how subjects respond to prosocial pun-
ishment (columns 1-2) and anti-social punishment (columns 3-4). The dependent
variable is the change in contribution from period t to t+1 conditional on receiving
punishment points in period t. The variable Punish Receive is the total number of
punishment points received in period t. Also note that the definition of prosocial
and anti-social punishment is slightly different from previous analyses. Here, proso-
cial punishment implies that the punished subject contributes less than other group
member’s average contribution. Anti-social punishment is defined analogously. This
adjustment is crucial because it is impossible to separate the effect of each punisher’s
punishment points assigned to the punished subject.
Results in column 1 indicate that non-rice subjects significantly increase their
contribution after receiving pro-social punishment. In particular, they increase 0.675
points for each pro-social punish point received. The interaction term “Punish Re-
ceive × Rice” is not significant, suggesting that there is no difference between rice
and non-rice subjects in how to react to pro-social punishment. The result for
antisocial punishment is shown in column 3. The “Punishment Received” is now
significantly negative, which implies that non-rice subjects decrease their contribu-
tion after receiving antisocial punishment. The interaction term “Punish Receive ×
Rice” is not significant, which means rice and non-rice subjects also behave similarly
in the response to anti-social punishment.
2.3.1 Regression Analyses
In the previous section, we show that rice subjects contribute more in the PGGs
with and without punishment and make more prosocial punishment compared to
non-rice subjects. All the results are either based on non-parametric tests comparing
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Table 2.3: Regressions regarding the Probability of Punishment and the Intensity
of Punishment Conditional on Punishing
Probability of Punishment Intensity of Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rice 0.0704* 0.0926** 0.0864** 0.453 0.431 0.308
(0.0410) (0.0402) (0.0387) (0.278) (0.266) (0.241)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.138*** -0.0810*** -0.0807*** -0.139 0.327 0.257
(0.0148) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.164) (0.251) (0.250)
Rice X Anti-Social Punishment -0.0163 -0.00946 -0.00933 0.00559 0.0542 0.236
(0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.342) (0.353) (0.333)
Punisher Contribution 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 0.0595 0.0392
(0.00306) (0.00307) (0.0368) (0.0311)
Punished Contribution -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0376** -0.0399**
(0.00199) (0.00199) (0.0190) (0.0170)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.0187*** -0.0186*** -0.0246 -0.0305
(0.00307) (0.00308) (0.0292) (0.0258)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.000171 0.00276
(0.00457) (0.0275)
Holistic Thinking -0.150** 0.299
(0.0661) (0.411)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.000112 0.299
(0.0339) (0.197)
Relative Income 0.00231 0.135
(0.0207) (0.141)
Risk Attitude 0.0103 0.141*
(0.00788) (0.0775)
Male 0.0183 0.687***
(0.0282) (0.243)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.00252 0.222
(0.0259) (0.169)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0819** -0.127
(0.0357) (0.215)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.0161 -0.137
(0.0319) (0.247)
Collectivistic 0.000413 0.0702
(0.0338) (0.254)
Individualistic 0.0632* 0.396*
(0.0349) (0.216)
Trustworty (Belief) -0.00920 0.0222
(0.00810) (0.0590)
Public Order (Belef) 0.00160 0.0195
(0.00608) (0.0507)
Period -0.0233 0.0198 0.0206 0.103 0.148 0.0197
(0.0458) (0.0454) (0.0453) (0.293) (0.289) (0.283)
Period Squared 0.000555 -0.000961 -0.000985 -0.00600 -0.00758 -0.00204
(0.00182) (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0112)
Constant 0.554** 0.445 0.323 1.736 1.220 -1.090
(0.278) (0.277) (0.308) (1.811) (1.807) (2.146)
Observations 7519 7519 7519 2379 2379 2379
Notes: Columns 1-3 are Random Effects Linear Probability models and the dependent variable is the probability of
punishing Free-rider and Cooperators. Columns 4-6 are tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the amount
of punishment points assigned to other group member who contributed more or less than the punisher. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Random Effects Panel Regression on how subjects respond to punishment
Pro-Social Punishment Anti-Social Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Punish Receive 0.675*** 0.663*** -0.362*** -0.375***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.137) (0.138)
Punish Rec. X Rice 0.0287 0.0439 0.294 0.302
(0.172) (0.170) (0.211) (0.205)
Rice 0.0744 -0.0285 -0.125 -0.0678
(0.290) (0.291) (0.164) (0.166)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.00270 -0.0139
(0.0254) (0.0207)
Holistic Thinking 0.353 0.636**
(0.412) (0.263)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.0236 0.0450
(0.249) (0.152)
Relative Income -0.236* 0.0966
(0.125) (0.119)
Risk Attitude -0.00918 -0.0220
(0.0499) (0.0588)
Male 0.493** -0.0912
(0.223) (0.139)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.488*** 0.166
(0.179) (0.144)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0355 -0.00209
(0.190) (0.164)
Single Child (Dummy) 0.524** -0.120
(0.230) (0.144)
Collectivistic -0.0131 0.0478
(0.177) (0.185)
Individualistic -0.0853 -0.169
(0.208) (0.156)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.0192 0.0805
(0.0412) (0.0531)
Public Order (Belef) -0.000724 -0.00852
(0.0398) (0.0479)
Period -0.951** -0.907** 0.0393 0.0631
(0.467) (0.459) (0.480) (0.484)
Period Squared 0.0371* 0.0353* -0.00672 -0.00779
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0207) (0.0208)
Constant 6.730** 6.296** 0.0443 -0.813
(2.705) (3.058) (2.731) (3.059)
Observations 1461 1461 1465 1465
Notes: the dependent variable is the change in contribution from t to t+1 conditional on receiving punishment
points in period t. Punish receive is the total number of punishment points received in period t. Columns 1 and 2
investigates cases in which the punished subject contributes less than other group member’s average contribution
(response to prosocial punishment). Columns 3 and 4 investigates cases in which the punished subject contributes
more than other group member’s average contribution (response to anti-social punishment). Cluster Standard errors
(PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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subjects from rice areas to subjects from non-rice areas, or regression analyses using
the Rice dummy as the main independent variable of interest.
In the following, we use a finer level of rice statistic, which is the percentage of
cultivated land devoted to rice paddy fields at the municipality level, to validate the
tests conducted in the previous section. Note that in this specification, the variable
of interest is a continuous variable (the Rice dummy used previously is based on
the province level rice statistics. Regressions using the Rice dummy as independent
variable are presented in the Appendix A.2 and the results are similar).22 Moreover,
we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables.
The set of control variables and their descriptions are presented in table 2.5.23
Table 2.6 illustrates that the higher the percentage of cultivated land devoted to
rice paddy fields, the higher the contribution in the PGGs, which is congruent with
Result 1 and Result 2 (see table A.2 in the Appendix A.2 for the results using the
Rice dummy variable). Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the no punishment
condition. The variable of interest is positive and significant at the 10% level. It
implies that a 10% increase in the percentage of cultivated land devoted to paddy
field is associated with a 1.2 increase in contribution. This result is not attenuated
by the inclusion of control variables (Column 2).
Subject’s contribution in the punishment condition is shown in columns 3 and
4. The coefficient in column 3 suggest that a 10% increase in the percentage of cul-
tivated land devoted to paddy field is associated with a 1.8 increase in contribution,
and it is significant at the 5% level. This result is also robust to the inclusion of the
control variables.
Table 2.7 shows that the percentage of paddy field is positively associated with
pro-social punishment but not anti-social punishment, which confirms Result 3 (see
22Note that for both the dummy and continuous specification, we also ran the regressions using
the Hierarchy Model under five levels: Province level, Municipality level, Session level, PGG group
level, and Individual level. The results are the same.
23Three subjects are dropped in the regression analyses with control variables. One subject did
not provide their Hukou place at the municipality level so we cannot match him to the rice statistic.
One subject did not state whether he has a Rural or Urban Hukou. Moreover, these two subjects
provided the incorrect student number so we cannot recover the information using administrative
data. Another subject need to leave early, so she did not answer the social style questionnaire. In
order to keep the number of observation consistent between regressions with and without control
variables, we dropped these three observations in the regressions without control variables. Note
that the results are not affected if we do not drop these subjects in the regressions without control
variables.
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Table 2.5: Description of Control Variables
Variable Name Description
GDP per capita (Munic-
ipality)
GDP per capita at the municipality level. The latest
data available (2014) from the province level Bureau of
Statistics websites and matched with subject’s Hukou
place.
Holistic Thinking Percentage of holistic choices in the Triad task. The
main dependent variable in Talhelm et al. (2014).
Collectivism & Individu-
alism
In the highly influential work, Hofstede (1980) proposed
the questionnaire in order to compare societies based on
different social styles. The core element of Individualism
is that individuals are independent of each other. On
the other hand, group membership is a central aspect of
collectivism.
Priming (Dummy) A dummy variable equals one if the data comes from the
priming treatment (See the Experimental Design section
for the description of the priming treatment).
From Rural (Dummy) A dummy variable equals one if the subject Has a Rural
Hukou, equals zero otherwise.
Relative Income Relative income assesses subjects income level relative
to their town of residence. There are four levels, “Way
Above”, “Above”, “Same”, “Below”, and “Way Below”.
Risk Attitude The number of risk seeking choices in the non-
incentivized Holt & Laury lottery task.
Single Child (Dummy) A dummy variable equals one if the subject has no sib-
lings, equals zero otherwise.
Natural Science
(Dummy)
According to China’s Education Policy, students in se-
nior high school need to choose between two screams,
the social-science-oriented area, which focuses on his-
tory, politics and geography and the natural-science-
oriented area, which focuses on physics, chemistry and
biology. In the National Higher Education Entrance Ex-
amination, the two streams have separate exam papers.
Please note that students who choose the social-science-
oriented also need to study physics, chemistry and biol-
ogy, but to a lesser degree. This is also true for students
in the natural-science-oriented.
Trustworthy Measures to what extend subjects believe that people
from the local province are trustworthy. Likert scale: 0
”Strongly Disagree” and 10 ”Strongly Agree”.
Public Order (Belief) Measures to what extend subjects believe that people
from the local province obey public order, for example,
do not jump queues, do not spit, and do not shout in
public spaces. Likert scale: 0 ”Strongly Disagree” and
10 ”Strongly Agree”.
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Table 2.6: Random Effects Panel Regressions regarding the contribution in the
PGGs.
PGG without Punishment PGG with Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perc. Paddy Field (Municipality) 0.0125* 0.0121* 0.0180** 0.0166**
(0.00726) (0.00696) (0.00785) (0.00733)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0321 0.0454
(0.0596) (0.0608)
Holistic Thinking 1.375* 0.374
(0.772) (0.735)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.265 -0.392
(0.412) (0.413)
Relative Income -0.566** -0.296
(0.281) (0.238)
Risk Attitude 0.0727 0.160
(0.117) (0.106)
Male 2.042*** 2.179***
(0.462) (0.370)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.651* 1.311***
(0.380) (0.393)
Priming (Dummy) -0.461 -0.148
(0.542) (0.569)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.345 -0.0580
(0.477) (0.409)
Collectivistic 0.499 0.692
(0.443) (0.466)
Individualistic -0.629 -0.433
(0.428) (0.390)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.0784 0.123
(0.0900) (0.105)
Public Order (Belef) -0.0358 -0.0469
(0.0919) (0.0807)
Period 1.191*** 1.191*** 2.244*** 2.244***
(0.171) (0.171) (0.301) (0.302)
Period sqaured -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.0746*** -0.0746***
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Constant 7.926*** 7.284*** -4.118** -7.531**
(0.429) (2.552) (1.772) (3.077)
Observations 4112 4112 4112 4112
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution in the PGG without punishment (columns 1 and 2) and with
punishment (columns 3 and 4). Perc. Paddy Field is the percentage of cultivated land devoted to paddy fields
at the municipality level. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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table A.3 in appendix A.2 for the results using the Rice dummy variable). Column
1 shows that a 10% increase in the percentage of cultivated land devoted to paddy
field leads to 1.1 more punishment points assigned to free-riders. Post regression test
suggests that Perc. of Paddy Field is not associated with anti-social punishment (p
> 0.27). These results are not affected by the inclusion of the set of control variables
(column 2).
Table 2.7: Tobit Regressions regarding amount of punishment assigned to free-riders
and cooperators.
(1) (2)
Perc. Paddy Field (Municipality) 0.0111** (0.00470) 0.0115** (0.00455)
Anti-Social Punishment -1.442*** (0.264) -0.871*** (0.289)
Perc Rice Paddy X Anti-Social Punishment -0.00431 (0.00470) -0.00347 (0.00491)
Punisher Contribution 0.0582 (0.0396)
Punished Contribution -0.0561*** (0.0209)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.102*** (0.0363)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0291 (0.0432)
Holistic Thinking -1.189** (0.492)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.0467 (0.273)
Relative Income 0.147 (0.199)
Risk Attitude 0.144 (0.0911)
Male 0.462 (0.321)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.0420 (0.251)
Priming (Dummy) 0.615* (0.359)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.332 (0.346)
Collectivistic 0.109 (0.369)
Individualistic 0.691* (0.368)
Trustworty (Belief) -0.0544 (0.0785)
Public Order (Belef) -0.00268 (0.0613)
Period -0.244 (0.451) -0.00224 (0.448)
Period Squared 0.00416 (0.0181) -0.00426 (0.0179)
Constant 0.949 (2.743) -2.139 (3.100)
Observations 7519 7519
Notes: the dependent variable is the punishment points assigned to group members who contributes less or more
than the punisher. Perc. Paddy Field is the percentage of cultivated land devoted to paddy fields at the municipality
level. Anti-Social punishment is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the punished subject contributes more than
the punisher. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
In table 2.3, we show that subjects from rice farming areas are more likely to
punish free-riders and conditional on punishing, there is no difference in the intensity
of punishment (Result 4.b). These findings are also not affected by the set of control
variables (columns 3 and 6). We replicate this result using the Perc. Paddy Field as
the independent variable. The findings are presented in table 2.8 and are consistent
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with the regressions using the rice dummy variable (table 2.3). Columns 1-3 of
table 2.8 show that the percentage of rice paddy field is positively associated with
the probability of prosocial punishment. However, it does not predict the intensity of
punishment conditional on punishing (columns 4-6). Note that in columns 4 and 5,
the Perc. Paddy Field coefficient is weakly signifiant. However, it looses significance
after including the set of control variables (column 6).
2.4 Alternative Explanations
2.4.1 Rice Farming and Social Preferences
In the previous section, we have shown that rice subjects contribute more than non-
rice subjects in the PGGs, and rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders.
There are a number of well known social preference models that can potentially
rationalize these differences. These include: inequality aversion models (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), models that incorporate social welfare
or efficiency concerns (Charness and Rabin, 2002), and reciprocity models (Rabin,
1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In this subsection, we discuss the explanatory
power of each model.
Results from the dictator game and ultimatum game, which are presented in fig-
ure 2.3, suggest that pure altruism and inequality aversion is not the main difference
between rice and non-rice subjects. Panel (a) and panel (c) of figure 2.3 present the
distribution of offers in the dictator game and ultimatum game respectively. The
distribution between rice and non-rice is very similar (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test:
p > 0.95 for dictator game and ultimatum game). Responder’s behavior in the
two games is presented in panel (b) and (d). There is also no significant difference
between rice and non-rice subjects (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p > 0.66 for the
dictator game and ultimatum game).
In reciprocity models, beliefs about other’s behavior play an important role. We
did not elicit subjects’ beliefs or ask subjects to make a contingent contribution plan
based on other group member’s contribution as in Fischbacher et al. (2001). This is
because we employed a repeated PGG and each session already lasts about 2 hours.
Nevertheless, in the following, we present four pieces of evidence showing that the
difference in beliefs might not be an important factor in explaining the results.
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Figure 2.3: Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game
(a) Proposal in the DG (b) Expected to Receive in DG
(c) Proposal in the UG (d) Responder Behavior in the UG
Notes: In the DG, while proposers were making decisions, responders were asked to specify the amount they expect
to receive from the proposer. Responders knew that this would not affect the outcome of the dictator game and the
proposers were not informed about this procedure. In the UG, responder’s minimal acceptable offer was elicited.
Before knowing the actual offers made by proposers, responders were asked to specify a number, which is the
Minimal acceptable offer. If the proposer’s offer is higher than or equal to this number, the offer is automatically
accepted. Otherwise, the offer is automatically rejected.
First, if rice and non-rice subjects hold different beliefs, we should observe that
rice’s contribution is different to non-rice in the very first period of the PGG. We have
already shown in the previous section that the difference is very weak. Moreover,
the difference in the second period is also small (Mann whitney U test, each group as
an independent observation: p = 0.07). Second, in the dictator game, the amount
responders expect to receive from the dictators does not differ between rice and
non-rice regions. Third, in the post experimental questionnaire, we asked subjects
to what extend they believe that people from the local province obey public order,
for example, do not jump queues, do not spit, and do not shout in public areas (10
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points scale, 1 = completely disobey, 10 = completely obey). The average score in
rice and non-rice regions is not significantly different from each other (Mann whitney
U test: p > 0.21). Last but not least, the proportion of the efficient choice in the
stag hunt game is very similar between rice and non-rice subjects (Two-sample test
of proportions: none rice = 72.7%; rice = 72.4%; p > 0.94). Please note that ‘hare’
in the stage hunt game is a risk dominance action, which means if one is uncertain
of other player’s strategy, the expected payoff of selecting ‘hare’ is higher. On the
other hand, ‘stag’ is the best response if one believes that the other player also
choose the efficient action. Since both rice and non-rice subjects coordinate so well
on the efficient outcome, it is reasonable to attribute this to the fact that they hold
similar beliefs regarding the level of cooperativeness of other participants.
Reciprocity models also incorporate cases in which subjects reciprocate on final
outcomes. Relating to the PGGs, subjects might contribute more if other group
members contributed more in the previous periods. To test whether rice and non-
rice subjects differ in this regard, we conduct two random effects panel regressions
similar to Croson (2007).
The results in table 2.9 illustrate that there is no difference in the level of reci-
procity between rice and non-rice subjects. Column 1 shows the results for the no
punishment condition. The lag of other group member’s Min, Median, and Max
are all positively signifiant. However, regarding the interaction terms, only the “lag
of others’ max × Rice” is significant at 10% level. This suggests that rice subjects
are slightly more responsive to the maximum of other group member’s contribution.
None of the interaction terms is significant in the punishment condition (column 2).
This result alongside with the finding that rice and non-rice subjects hold similar
beliefs suggest that the reciprocity models might not be able to account for the
behavioral differences in the PGGs between the two regions.
2.4.2 Differences other than Rice Cultivation
The rice and non-rice provinces in our sample differ in other aspects besides the
type of cultivation. Therefore, our finding might be a manifestation of the other
differences instead of the difference in rice farming. In this subsection, we discuss
several possible alternative explanations in detail and show that our results are less
likely driven by other factors.
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First of all, please note that a number of factors are already controlled by design.
Nearly all of the subjects are first year, Han Chinese university students. Therefore,
they all speak Mandarin, have similar education background, share the same culture
origin (Wen et al., 2004), and live in the same political institution.24
Secondly, our results might be driven by the difference in economic development
and market integration, since Henrich et al. (2010, 2001) find that these variables are
positively associated with the level of cooperation and trust. In the previous section,
we showed that our results are not affected by controlling for the municipality level
GDP per capita as well as whether the subject come from rural or urban areas.
Third, climate might also have an effect on people’s behavior. According to
the pathogen prevalence theory, in regions that are prevalent of transmittable dis-
eases, interaction with strangers are dangerous. Therefore, there is an evolutionary
pressure for people living in those environments to form small and closed social
groups, which consequently leads to the development of a more collective social
norm (Fincher et al., 2008). Since rice areas in our sample are warmer than non-rice
areas, and pathogens are highly correlated with temperature (Guernier et al., 2004),
our results might be driven by the difference in climate instead of cultivation. Due
to perfect collinearity, we are unable to control for temperature. However, in the
following, we present two pieces of evidence to show that our results are less likely
driven by climate difference. First, we administrated the Individualism and Collec-
tivism questionnaire and find no difference between rice and non-rice subjects. We
also controlled for subject’s level of collectivism in the regression analyses, and the
results are not affected. Second, all the four provinces have similar climate. Ac-
cording the Koppen climate classification, which is the mostly widely used method,
three of the provinces in our sample belong to the same group C temperate climate
category.
Lastly, if our results are driven by other cross province unobservable factors,
we should observe differences between the two rice farming provinces as well as
differences between the two non-rice farming provinces. The results in table 2.10
and table 2.11 suggest this is not the case. The results show that subjects from the
two rice provinces behave similarly in the PGGs. This is also true for subjects from
24See Guiso et al. (2006) for a review of the effect of culture on economic outcomes. Chen (2013)
find that the necessity to grammatically distinguish future and present events leads to more a
present biased time preference. Bo´ et al. (2010) discover that people are more cooperative in social
dilemma situations under democratic institutions.
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the two non-rice provinces. In the appendix A.2, we also show that the probability
of punishment as well as the intensity of punishment conditional on punishing are
also similar among rice subjects (table A.4) and non-rice subjects (table A.5).
At the very least, we believe it is very unlikely that the factors that confound
rice cultivation are only able to affect subject’s behavior in the PGGs but not other
measures, such as behavior in DG, UG, Stag Hunt, as well as the answers in the
Triad task and Social styles questionnaires.
2.4.3 Self selection into rice and non-rice regions
Our main findings might also be driven by sorting. In particular, if a family does
not like the social norm of a rice region, they can move to a non-rice province, or
vice versa. We address this issue by further excluding observations whose father’s
birth place was a rice province but themselves have Hukou from a non-rice province
or vise versa. Differently put, we drop subjects who had likely been migrated into
or out of rice farming regions.
This strategy can control for the self selection issue because prior to 1990, the
Chinese government had enforced laws that restricted immigration and travel within
China.25 Also note that China has strict immigration control since the Qin Dynasty
(221 to 206 BC). This is because people are a scare resource. Both women and men
are needed to tend the farming lands and men are required to form armies (See
Jinguang (2004) for the documentation of the policy in Qin Dynasty; see the Book
of Han for immigration policy in Han Dynasty; See the Tang Code for the policy
in Tang Dynasty; See the Collected Regulations of the Great Ming for the policy in
Ming Dynasty.)
We did not ask subjects for their father’s age, but it is reasonable to assume
that their father had born before the time when the immigration law was lifted.26
Consequently, the birth place of subject’s father was not due to selection, and sub-
jects who still have the same Hukou as their father’s should be free from selection
issues. About 8 subjects are dropped, and the results are not affected by excluding
them. As a further check, we drop 9 subjects whose grow up province has a different
25See Qian (2008) and the references therein for the details about the policy.
26The normal age for the first year undergraduate student is 18 years old. Therefore, their
parents had born before the lift of the immigration law as long as they had their children after 8
years old.
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type of cultivation than their father’s birth place. Our results are also robust in this
specification.
2.5 Discussion
In the previous sections, we show that rice subjects contribute more than non-
rice subjects in the PGGs with and without punishment, with the difference much
stronger in the punishment condition. We also find that rice subjects are more
likely to punish free-riders, and conditional on punishing, there is no difference in
the intensity of punishment. Based on these results, we argue in the following
that the practice of rice farming probably does not change people’s preference for
cooperation. Instead, is it more likely the case that people in rice areas understand
the public goods situation differently than their non-rice counterparts.
First, if individuals from rice farming regions have a preference for cooperation,
they should contribute more than non-rice subjects in the no punishment condition.
However, this is not the case. The difference over the eight periods is relatively
weak, and the contribution level is the same in the first period.
Second, the possibility of future interaction is crucial for cooperation to emerge in
the absent of punishment opportunities (Rand and Nowak, 2013), and rice subjects
seem to understand this feature. According to the contribution pattern in the no
punishment condition (period 1-8 of figure 2.1), rice subject’s contribution increases
at the early periods when there is more room for future interaction. However, their
cooperation level tumbles down in later periods. On the other hand, the contribution
pattern of non-rice subjects are relatively flat over interaction (see table 2.2).
Third, rice subjects are more willing to punishment free-riders, which is one
of the most effective way to foster cooperation (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Masclet
et al., 2003). Moreover, there is no difference between rice and non-rice subjects
in punishing cooperators, which is detrimental for cooperation (Herrmann et al.,
2008). We also find that the difference in pro-social punishment mainly comes from
the fact that rice subjects are more likely to punish free-riders, and conditional
on punishing, there is no difference in the intensity of punishment. Rice subject’s
punishing behavior is efficient because more punishment points assigned to free-
riders does not lead to higher cooperation level (Result 5 shows that rice and non-rice
subjects respond similarly to punishment), the act of punishment alone is sufficient
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to boost cooperation.
The reason that people from rice farming areas are more willing to exercise
their right to punish is probably the fact that punishment is easy to enforce in
rice farming environments. First, since rice farming requires a large amount of
labour, each farmer benefits from successful cooperation. This feature ensures that
free-riding is socially undesirable in the rice farming societies. Second, the paddy
fields are usually plain lands without any shelter, therefore, each farmer’s effort is
easily observable. Third, the cost of avoiding punishment or choosing the “outside
option” is extremely high for farmers, since they will loose their farming land if
they migrate to another area. Last but not least, the names of the free-riders might
spread relatively fast within the village, since rural villages are usually small and
closed communities. These characteristics are in line with Debraj’s summarization of
the broad conditions that need to be satisfied for punishment behavior to occur. The
conditions include: positive individual gain from successful cooperation, member’s
action must be observable by others, and sanctions must be enforceable ((Ray,
1998)).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the origins of the cross cultural differences in the level of co-
operativeness. In particular, we show that rice cultivation that practiced hundreds
of years ago leads to a cooperative social norm that is intergenerational transmit-
table. To test our hypothesis, we travelled to four typical rice and non-rice farming
provinces in China and recruited local university students who had minimal farming
experience as subjects. We find that compared to subjects from non-rice regions,
subjects from rice areas contribute more in both the no-punishment and punish-
ment conditions of the public goods game. Rice subjects are also more likely to
punish free-riders and conditional on punishing, there is no difference in the amount
of punishment. Importantly, we did not find any difference between rice and non-
rice subjects in games that do no involve cooperation, such as the DG, UG, and
Stag Hunt game. These results suggest that rice cultivation might not change indi-
vidual’s preference for cooperation. Instead, is it more likely the case that people
in rice areas understand the public goods situation differently than their non-rice
counterparts.
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Table 2.8: Regressions regarding the Probability of Punishment and the Intensity
of Punishment Conditional on Punishing using Municipality level Rice statistics
Probability of Punishment Intensity of Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Perc. Paddy Field (Municipality) 0.000945* 0.00120** 0.00111** 0.00610* 0.00585* 0.00433
(0.000508) (0.000496) (0.000478) (0.00340) (0.00325) (0.00306)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.137*** -0.0813*** -0.0809*** -0.106 0.358 0.279
(0.0156) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.166) (0.248) (0.249)
Perc. Paddy Field X Anti-Social Punishment -0.000206 -0.000105 -0.000105 -0.000805 -0.000186 0.00217
(0.000321) (0.000319) (0.000318) (0.00405) (0.00415) (0.00394)
Punisher Contribution 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 0.0598 0.0396
(0.00306) (0.00308) (0.0368) (0.0312)
Punished Contribution -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0373* -0.0397**
(0.00199) (0.00199) (0.0192) (0.0171)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.0187*** -0.0186*** -0.0249 -0.0310
(0.00307) (0.00308) (0.0293) (0.0258)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.000158 0.00298
(0.00456) (0.0278)
Holistic Thinking -0.145** 0.314
(0.0660) (0.417)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.000113 0.296
(0.0337) (0.197)
Relative Income 0.00170 0.133
(0.0209) (0.142)
Risk Attitude 0.0102 0.140*
(0.00787) (0.0778)
Male 0.0191 0.690***
(0.0283) (0.247)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.00242 0.219
(0.0259) (0.169)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0825** -0.119
(0.0357) (0.215)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.0158 -0.139
(0.0318) (0.245)
Collectivistic 0.000961 0.0705
(0.0338) (0.253)
Individualistic 0.0634* 0.398*
(0.0349) (0.216)
Trustworty (Belief) -0.00880 0.0246
(0.00810) (0.0589)
Public Order (Belef) 0.00125 0.0175
(0.00609) (0.0511)
Period -0.0232 0.0198 0.0206 0.108 0.153 0.0271
(0.0458) (0.0454) (0.0453) (0.291) (0.286) (0.283)
Period Squared 0.000549 -0.000961 -0.000986 -0.00622 -0.00781 -0.00236
(0.00182) (0.00180) (0.00179) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0112)
Constant 0.549** 0.440 0.312 1.680 1.158 -1.183
(0.278) (0.277) (0.307) (1.803) (1.802) (2.169)
sigma
Constant 1.864*** 1.852*** 1.754***
(0.168) (0.169) (0.137)
Perc. Paddy Field (Municipality)
Observations 7519 7519 7519 2379 2379 2379
Notes: Columns 1-3 are Random Effects Linear Probability models and the dependent variable is the probability of
punishing Free-rider and Cooperators. Columns 4-6 are tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the amount
of punishment points assigned to other group member who contributed more or less than the punisher. Perc. Paddy
Field is the percentage of cultivated land devoted to paddy fields at the municipality level. Cluster Standard errors
(PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Random Effects Panel Regressions about reciprocity in the PGGs
(1) (2)
No Punishment Punishment
Rice 0.0991 0.432
(0.649) (0.775)
Other Median (Lag) 0.152*** 0.442***
(0.0503) (0.0606)
Rice x Other Median -0.0856 -0.0139
(0.0715) (0.0714)
Other Max (Lag) 0.154*** 0.130**
(0.0288) (0.0510)
Rice x Other Max 0.0824* 0.0480
(0.0481) (0.0710)
Other Min (Lag) 0.251*** 0.141***
(0.0465) (0.0376)
Rice x Other Min 0.0329 -0.0373
(0.0631) (0.0483)
Period 0.675*** -0.276
(0.201) (0.317)
Period square -0.0944*** 0.00818
(0.0205) (0.0120)
Punish Receive (Lag) -0.290***
(0.0638)
Constant 3.827*** 6.068***
(0.563) (2.148)
Observations 3619 3619
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution in the PGGs. Other Max (lag) is the maximum of other group
members contribution in the previous period. Other Median and Min (Lag) are defined analogously. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Random Effects Panel Regressions Comparing contribution in the PGG
with punishment between the two rice provinces and the two non-rice provinces.
Non-Rice Provinces Rice Provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shandong -1.114 -0.534
(0.890) (0.781)
Zhejiang 0.531 0.319
(0.902) (0.989)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) 0.115 -0.0543
(0.0736) (0.0911)
Holistic Thinking 0.283 0.373
(0.804) (1.164)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.278 -0.609
(0.710) (0.526)
Relative Income -0.533* 0.187
(0.279) (0.364)
Risk Attitude 0.0525 0.261*
(0.159) (0.148)
Male 2.142*** 1.947***
(0.575) (0.460)
Natural Science (Dummy) 1.771*** 0.604
(0.513) (0.557)
Priming (Dummy) -0.533 0.286
(0.738) (0.858)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.172 0.311
(0.623) (0.570)
Collectivistic 0.941 0.187
(0.625) (0.673)
Individualistic -0.0409 -0.611
(0.557) (0.546)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.208 -0.00377
(0.133) (0.148)
Public Order (Belef) -0.143 0.0928
(0.105) (0.117)
period 1.875*** 2.633***
(0.386) (0.468)
period × period -0.0623*** -0.0876***
(0.0144) (0.0183)
Constant 12.49*** -6.757 13.16*** -6.853*
(0.729) (4.661) (0.645) (3.929)
Observations 2112 2112 2000 2000
Notes: the dependent variable is the contribution in the PGG with punishment. The results are the same for the
no punishment condition. We did not include it because the difference is weak between rice and non-rice. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Tobit Regressions Comparing punishment behavior between the two rice
provinces and the two non-rice provinces.
Non-Rice Provinces Rice Provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shandong -0.163 0.278
(0.408) (0.382)
Zhejiang 0.167 -0.146
(0.634) (0.731)
Anti-Social Punishment -1.471*** -1.312*** -1.918*** -1.743***
(0.315) (0.257) (0.458) (0.450)
Shandong x Anti-Social Punishment 0.246 0.0129
(0.457) (0.402)
Zhejiang x Anti-Social Punishment 0.0114 0.0829
(0.601) (0.549)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0902 0.0108
(0.0565) (0.0686)
Holistic Thinking -1.430** -1.516*
(0.646) (0.853)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.107 0.218
(0.362) (0.392)
Relative Income -0.0714 0.357
(0.298) (0.264)
Risk Attitude 0.227* -0.0524
(0.123) (0.143)
Male -0.128 1.040**
(0.275) (0.507)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.173 0.0946
(0.351) (0.380)
Priming (Dummy) 0.923** 0.155
(0.410) (0.588)
Single Child (Dummy) 0.0293 -0.563
(0.382) (0.515)
Collectivistic -0.0617 0.360
(0.517) (0.489)
Individualistic 0.811* 0.150
(0.429) (0.520)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.0252 -0.130
(0.102) (0.113)
Public Order (Belef) -0.0802 0.0761
(0.0773) (0.0979)
period 0.157 0.163 -0.741 -0.757
(0.542) (0.510) (0.722) (0.707)
period × period -0.0132 -0.0132 0.0255 0.0264
(0.0222) (0.0209) (0.0284) (0.0278)
Constant -0.901 -2.811 4.339 3.376
(3.179) (3.469) (4.484) (4.890)
Observations 3985 3985 3534 3534
Notes: rhe dependent variable is the amount of punishment points assigned to free-riders or cooperators. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Does testosterone foster
reputation concerns?
3.1 Introduction
Testosterone is a steroid hormone that plays a critical role in brain development
and sexual behavior for both males and females. Early studies, using animals as
subjects, have established a causal link between testosterone and aggressive behavior
(Edwards, 1969; Beeman, 1947). However, recent evidence suggests that the role of
testosterone on human’s behavior is more complicated. It causes aggressive behavior
only when individual’s status is being challenged (Eisenegger et al., 2011; Mazur and
Booth, 1998). These findings lead researchers to hypothesize that testosterone’s
main role in human social interaction is to promote dominance behavior, that is,
actions to achieve or maintain high social status (Mazur and Booth, 1998; Josephs
et al., 2006; Terburg et al., 2009; Josephs et al., 2003).
There is mounting evidence in the psychology and neuroscience literature sup-
porting the dominance hypothesis. Testosterone has been shown to reduce uncon-
scious fear (van Honk et al., 2005), foster responsiveness to angry faces (van Honk
et al., 2001), and increase vigilance to social threats (van Honk et al., 1999). These
findings suggest that one important role of testosterone is modifying human’s phys-
ical and psychological fitness so that they are more prepared for impending social
challenges. Additionally, van Honk et al. (2011) find that testosterone impairs cog-
nitive empathy. Empathy means that people are concerned with the emotions or
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welfares of others. However, this concern might cause adverse effects when compet-
ing with rivals (Eisenegger et al., 2011). Last but not least, results from Bos et al.
(2010) and Boksem et al. (2013) suggest that testosterone decreases trust. This
finding is also consistent with the dominance hypothesis, because the decision to
trust others bears the risk that the trust been exploited and thus give the betrayer
a relative advantage in the competition for status.
Although the aforementioned evidence does not link testosterone to aggressive
behavior per se, it increases the chance of social conflict. Note that social status can
also be obtained by prosocial behavior in situations where there is no potential social
challenges (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge,
no study has investigated whether testosterone leads to status enhancing behavior
even in the absence of status threats.
In this paper, we fill this gap by testing whether testosterone leads to prosocial
behavior in the context of charitable donations. We believe charitable donation is a
perfect environment for the hypothesis because numerous studies have demonstrated
that reputation or status concern is an important motivation underlying individuals’
giving behavior (see Harbaugh (1998); Glazer and Konrad (1996) for theoretical
models and Andreoni and Petrie (2004); Rege and Telle (2004); Van Vugt and Hardy
(2010); Ariely et al. (2009); Kataria and Regner (2015); Karlan and McConnell
(2014); Soetevent (2005); Alp´ızar et al. (2008); Alp´ızar and Martinsson (2013); List
et al. (2004) for empirical evidence.)
Seventy-seven healthy white female participated in our study. A single dose of
0.5 mg of testosterone or placebo was applied sublingually in a randomized and
double-blind fashion. Only females were recruited because it takes about 4 hours
for a single sublingual administration of 0.5mg of testosterone to have a neurophys-
iological effect. The time is unknown for males (Tuiten et al., 2000). Subjects were
asked to work on a real effort task to generate money for their chosen charity. They
were not allowed to earn money for themselves in the real effort task because first,
monetary incentives might dilute the status value of donation (Ariely et al., 2009;
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006), and second, financial payments might add another layer
of complexity to subject’s behavior, because studies have discovered that testos-
terone makes people more motivated towards monetary rewards (Eisenegger et al.,
2011; Hermans et al., 2010).
Subjects’ reputation concerns were manipulated in three experimental condi-
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tions. In the honor condition, subjects who donated more than an exogenously set
threshold were publicly acknowledged. In the shame condition, the subject who
donated the least was identified in public.1 Subject’s effort in the two conditions
was compared to the baseline condition, in which all the donations were kept in
private. Our experimental setting combines both the within and between subjects
design features. The between element is the random administration of testosterone
and placebo; the within feature is that subjects participated in both baseline and
honor conditions (refer as honor treatment) or baseline and shame conditions (refer
as shame treatment) in each session. The honor treatment is a direct test of our
hypothesis because subjects can gain reputation by achieving a certain amount of
donation, and more importantly, there is no risk of losing of reputation. On the
other hand, the situation in the shame treatment is more related to the dominance
hypothesis since being publicized as the least donor is a loss of status.
We find that there is no behavioral differences between the placebo and testos-
terone group in both the honor and shame treatments. In the discussion section, we
argue that three factors might contribute to the null finding. First, the real effort
task might be too enjoyable. Second, the subjects were all female subjects. And
last, the null result might due to lack of statistical power. Power analyses conducted
in the experimental design section suggest that the shame treatment has enough sta-
tistical power to detect a large difference, but is underpowered for small effects; the
honor treatment, on the other hand, is underpowered even for large differences.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether testosterone
induces reputation seeking behavior in the absence of social threats. The two studies
that are closely related to ours are Eisenegger et al. (2010) and van Honk et al.
(2012). Eisenegger et al. (2010) find that testosterone causes subjects to make
fairer offers in the ultimatum game. Note that in bargaining situations, individual’s
social status can still be challenged. This is because the proposer faces the risk that
her offer might be rejected by the responder, which is considered as a social affront.
A higher or fairer offer significantly reduces the probability of rejection. Moreover,
one possible alternative explanation to their finding is that testosterone might make
people care about money, and hence subjects offer a fairer amount to the responder
to reduce the risk of rejection, in which case both the proposer and responder earn
1The reason that we switched from a absolute threshold in the honor condition to a relative
threshold in the shame condition is discussed in the experimental design section.
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nothing.
van Honk et al. (2012) find that subjects who intake testosterone contribute more
than the placebo group in a public goods game. However, it is hard to attribute their
findings to the effect of testosterone on reputation concerns. The reason is that all
the decisions were made in strict anonymity. The present study also contributes to
the literature that investigates the role of testosterone on human social interactions
(for a brilliant review see Eisenegger et al. (2011)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the experi-
mental design. The hypotheses are proposed in section 3.3. Section 3.4 illustrates
the results. Section 3.5 discusses several possible explanations of why we find a null
result, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
Seventy-seven healthy white female participants with an age range of 18 to 35 (mean
= 23.7) participated in the study. They were recruited via on campus advertisement
and mailing list at the University of Cape Town and were paid a flat fee of 200
RANDS. They were included in the study after signing a written consent and none
of the them withdrew in the middle of the experiment. The study was approved by
University of Cape Town Research Ethnics Committee (HREC REF 092/2011).2
A single dose of 0.5 mg of testosterone or placebo was applied sublingually in a
randomized and double-blind fashion. Only females were recruited because it takes
about 4 hours for a single sublingual administration of 0.5mg of testosterone to have
a neurophysiological effect, and the time is unknown for males (Tuiten et al., 2000).
Power analyses suggest that we need a total of 52 subjects to have a power
of 0.8 to detect a large effect under the 5% significance level. Since there were
seventy-seven subjects participated in the study, we have enough observation if we
combine both of the experimental treatments. The treatments are honor treatment
and shame treatment, in which we investigate the effect of testosterone on subject’s
motivation on the pursuit of honor and the avoidance of shame, respectively.3 We
2We were careful in our wording for the shaming procedure in order not to make them uncom-
fortable. Note that we are interested in how subject respond to the fact that the least donator
will be shamed, not the shaming itself. Therefore, the shaming is quite weak at the end of each
session.
3In this case, the hypothesis is that whether testosterone affect’s people’s reputation concerns
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have a total of 48 subjects in the shame treatment, which means that we have the
statistical power to detect a large difference for the shame treatment. However,
the honor treatment is underpowered to detect a large difference as there were 29
participants.
3.2.1 The real effort task
In the experiment, subjects worked on a real effort task in order to generate money
for charity organizations. We implemented a donation environment because nu-
merous studies, both theoretical and empirical, have shown that social status is an
important motivation underlying people’s charitable behavior (see Harbaugh (1998);
Glazer and Konrad (1996) for theoretical models and Andreoni and Petrie (2004);
Rege and Telle (2004); Van Vugt and Hardy (2010); Ariely et al. (2009); Kataria
and Regner (2015); Karlan and McConnell (2014); Soetevent (2005); Alp´ızar et al.
(2008); Alp´ızar and Martinsson (2013); List et al. (2004) for empirical evidence).
We employed a real effort task instead of a monetary windfall because firstly, we
believe that real effort task is more similar to real life situations, in which individuals
need to work to earn money and donate part of their earnings to charity. Secondly,
studies have documented that subjects behave more selfishly when their endowment
was earned via a real effort task comparative to windfall money in dictator games
(Cherry et al., 2002) and in the context of charitable donations (Carlsson et al.,
2013). Thus, we believe using a real effort task offers a more stringent test of our
hypotheses.
The real effort task is called find the ‘T’s. When the task starts, a page full of
symbols is presented on subject’s computer screen (figure 3.1). There are only two
different symbols, one is ‘+’ (panel A of figure 3.2) and the other is more similar to
the letter ‘T’ (panel B of figure 3.2). There are 20 ‘T’s and 60 ‘+’s on each page.
Participants are given 15 minutes to find as many ‘T’s as possible. Once all the 20
‘T’s have been found, a new page of symbols will appear. Subjects are informed
that they do not need to perform the task for the full fifteen minutes; they can stop
at any time they want. We also provide subjects with the option that they can
without further distinguishing between the pursuit for honor and the avoidance of shame. Results
suggest that the difference is not significant even if we combine the two treatments (Mann-Whitney
U test p > 0.89).
52
3.2. Experimental Design 3. Does testosterone foster reputation concerns?
continue to work on the task but no money will be generated.4 In order to prevent
random clicking without distinguishing ‘+’ and ‘T’, we impose the following rule:
Subjects are allowed to make no more than 3 mistakes on each page. If they make
the forth mistake all ‘T’s found on that page will be deselected, which means they
need to restart the page again. However, this does not affect previously solved pages.
Additionally, the number of mistakes on a page do not carry over to the next page.
In other words, once they have completed a page, the number of mistakes will be
reseted to zero.
We employed a diminishing payment scheme: 162.5 cents are donated for each
of the first 20 ‘T’s, 78 cents each for the next 20 ‘T’s, 51 cents each for the next 20
‘T’s, ..., and 3.15 cents for each ‘T’ above 380.5
Importantly, subjects were not allowed to earn any money for themselves in the
real effort task. In other words, all the money generated from the real effort task was
donated to charity. The reasons for this design are the following. First, the effect of
testosterone on reputation concerns might be weakened by the desire to earn money,
because studies have shown that testosterone makes people more motivated towards
monetary rewards (Eisenegger et al., 2011; Hermans et al., 2010). Second, monetary
incentives might dilute the status value of donation, as observers cannot distinguish
whether the higher donation is due to good deeds or simple to earn more money
(Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009). 6
3.2.2 Experimental Conditions and Treatments
Subjects’ image concerns were manipulated in three experimental conditions. In
the honor condition, subjects who donated more than an exogenously set threshold
were publicly acknowledged.7 In the shame condition, the subject who donated the
4We provide this option for subjects who are not interested in making donations but might be
interested in playing the real effort task. Note that no subject chose this option.
5We use this diminishing payment scheme to increase the relative cost of making donations.
Subjects who are less motivated should stop donating when the payoff is too low. Ariely et al.
(2009) also used a diminishing payment scheme.
6We believe that investigating the effect of testosterone on individual’s tradeoff between mon-
etary payment and reputation concern is very interesting. Possible designs to better understand
individual’s behavior include treatments in which subjects can only earn money for themselves and
can earn money for themselves as well as for charity. We leave these to future research.
7Note that in the honor condition, subjects knew that the honoring threshold is solving 26
pages. There is no such threshold in the baseline condition. In this case, there are two differences
between the baseline and honor condition. The first is the effect of honor, which we want to
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Figure 3.1: The real effort task – Find the ‘T’s
Figure 3.2: The real effort task – The different symbols
(a) (b)
least was identified in public. Subject’s effort in the two conditions is compared
to the baseline condition, in which all the donations were kept in private. Note
that we switched from a absolute threshold in the honor treatment to a relative
threshold in the shame treatment. The main reason for this modification is that we
can set a relatively high threshold in the honor treatment because our main interest
is how subjects respond to the image incentive. Whether or not they can achieve
identify. The other is the focal point, 26, which is only shown in the honor condition. In order to
make the baseline and honor condition comparable, we also primed the threshold in the baseline
condition. We stated in the instruction: “Note, earlier studies have shown that people can solve
19 tasks with little effort, and can solve 26 or more tasks with reasonable effort.”
54
3.2. Experimental Design 3. Does testosterone foster reputation concerns?
the threshold is not important. However, it is hard find a proper threshold for the
shame treatment. If the threshold is too low, subjects can easily avoid shame. On
the other hand, if the threshold is too high, subjects will know that all of them are
going to be ‘ashamed’, which is not a ‘punishment’ at all.
Subjects in each session participated in both the baseline and honor conditions
(the honor treatment) or the baseline and shame conditions (the shame treatment).
Note that the order is always baseline – honor (shame).8 In sum, we implemented a
2x2 between-within subjects design, with one treatment dimension as testosterone
and placebo, and the other as honor and shame (see table 3.1)
Table 3.1: Summary of Experimental Treatments
Placebo Testosterone
Honor Treatment Baseline – Honor Baseline – Honor
Shame Treatment Baseline – Shame Baseline – Shame
The honoring and shaming procedure was very simple. Those who donated more
than the threshold or donated the least in each session were asked to stand up. In the
honor treatment, the experimenter announced: “These people have solved 26 tasks
or more and hence donated the most, we would like to thank you for your efforts
and we will make sure that your chosen charities will benefit from your effort.” The
line was “This person solved the least, nevertheless we would like to thank everyone,
for your efforts” in the shame treatment.
3.2.3 Experiment Procedure
Participants arrived in the experimental lab between 9:00 and 12:00 in the morning.
They provided their saliva sample after signing a written consent. Afterwards, they
were instructed to intake either a testosterone or placebo pill. Participants then
completed a questionnaire, and their hands were scanned for the 2D:4D ratio. They
were free to leave and were required to return to the lab in the afternoon, about 4
hours after the testosterone intake.
In the afternoon, participants were asked to complete another set of question-
naires. The instructions for the first part of each treatment (the baseline condition)
8The small number of participants did not allow us to counter balance the order. Please see
the hypotheses section for a discussion of how this will affect our results.
55
3.3. Hypotheses 3. Does testosterone foster reputation concerns?
were subsequently distributed. Participants received the instructions of the second
part of the treatment (honor or shame condition) after the conclusion of the first
part. Subjects knew that there were more than one part in each session, but they
were not informed about the content of each condition before the corresponding
instructions were handed out. The honoring and shaming procedure was at the very
end of the experiment, after they completed a post experimental questionnaire. See
figure 3.3 for the sequence of the events in each session.
Figure 3.3: The Sequence of Events in Each Session
We conducted 6 sessions of Honor treatment between May and August 2013 and
10 sessions of Shame treatment between November 2013 and October 2014. All the
sessions were conducted in the University of Cape Town, South Africa.9
3.3 Hypotheses
In the honor treatment, subjects can gain reputation by being publicly acknowledged
as a generous donator. More importantly, there is no risk of losing status because
no one will be ‘ashamed’. Therefore, if testosterone makes people care about their
reputation even in absence of potential social threats, the testosterone group should
try harder to get acclaimed in the honor treatment. On the other hand, being
publicized as the least donator is a loss of reputation. Therefore, according to the
dominance hypothesis, we expect that the subjects who intake testosterone put
more effort in the shame condition relative to the baseline condition to avoid social
stigma.
9See Appendix B for the experimental instructions for the honor treatment. The instructions
for the Shame treatment is very similar.
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Subjects’ reactions to the reputation incentives are captured by the treatment
effect, defined as the number of ‘T’s find in the honor or shame condition minus the
number of ‘T’s find in the baseline condition. We use the treatment effect as our
main dependent variable because subjects participate in both baseline and honor
(shame) conditions in each session (the with-in element of our experiment). Thus,
it has the advantage that some individual specific unobservables, such as sympathy
towards their chosen charity, can be cancelled out.
Since reputation concern is an important motivation underlying charitable be-
havior, we expect the treatment effect in the honor and shame treatment is pos-
itive for both the testosterone and placebo group. Our main hypothesis that the
treatment effect is larger for the testosterone group, since studies have shown that
testosterone is a social hormone and makes people care more about their social sta-
tus. One caveat is that the order of the conditions is always baseline – honor (or
shame). Consequently, the higher donation in the honor and shame conditions rel-
ative to the baseline condition might simply due to learning. We want to point out,
however, that the effect of learning presents in both the testosterone and placebo
group. Hence, the difference in treatment effect between the two groups is still able
to identify the effect of testosterone on individual’s reputation concerns.10
Hypothesis 1. The treatment effect is significantly higher for the testosterone group
compared to the placebo group for both honor and shame treatments.
Studies have discovered that the neurophysiological effect of exogenously admin-
istration of testosterone is positively correlated with testosterone exposure during
the prenatal stage (van Honk et al., 2012, 2011). The intensity of prenatal testos-
terone exposure is marked by the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length
of the ring finger (2D:4D) (Lutchmaya et al., 2004; Manning, 2002). In particular,
the lower the 2D:4D ratio (index finger shorter than the ring finger) the stronger the
exposure to testosterone in the uterus. Relating these findings to our experimental
setting, subjects with a lower 2D:4D ratio are more influenced by testosterone and
hence have a larger treatment effect.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of testosterone intake on the treatment effect is stronger
10Our results might be biased if testosterone affect’s subject’s learning rate of the real effort
task. However, to the best of our knowledge, we do not find any evidence supporting the idea that
testosterone fosters or hinders learning in real effort tasks that are similar to the task implemented
in the present study.
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for subjects with low 2D:4D ratio (high prenatal exposure to testosterone) compared
to subjects with high 2D:4D ratio (low prenatal exposure to testosterone) for both
honor and shame treatments.
2D:4D also has a non-monotonic influence on altruism. Bran˜as-Garza et al.
(2013) find that subjects with both high and low 2D:4D are less altruistic than
subjects with intermediate values of the ratio. Relating this finding to the present
study, testosterone should have less effect on subjects with intermediate 2D:4D ratio
(altruistic individuals) because sympathy towards the recipients will motivate them
to donate a higher amount even in the absense of testosterone.11
Hypothesis 3. The effect of testosterone intake on the treatment effect is stronger
for subjects who have high or low 2D:4D (less altruistic) compared to subjects with
intermediate 2D:4D values (more altruistic).
The effect of testosterone might also interact with individual’s inherent sensi-
tivity to shame. In particular, in the shame treatment, testosterone might be less
effective on subjects who dislike being publicly ‘ashamed’. Subject’s level of shame
aversion is measured by the Social Desirability scale (Paulhus, 1984).12 The ques-
tionnaire assesses people’s tendency to make socially desirable responses to question-
naire questions, which also reflects people’s sensitivity to shame. This is because if
one is not motivated by image concerns, there is no need to report socially acceptable
answers to sensitive questions such as drug use or domestic violent behavior.
Hypothesis 4. In the shame treatment, subjects who have a inherently high level of
shame aversion (score higher in the Social Desirability scale) should be less affected
by testosterone in comparison to subjects who are less sensitive to shame.
In the field of psychology, the canonical model of human behavior suggests
that there are two motivational systems underlying individual’s action (Carver and
White, 1994; Elliot, 2006; Gray, 1990). One is the behavioral activation system
(BAS), which motivates people when there are cues for reward. The other is the
behavioral inhibition system, which influences behavior in situations with signs of
11We also administrated the altruism scale from the International Personality Item Pool. The
results are similar.
12The questionnaire was taken in the morning part of the experiment, before the testosterone
intake.
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impeding punishment. Jeong et al. (2011) find that BIS/BAS is correlated with
people’s giving behavior. In particular, they show that subjects who are more sensi-
tive to rewards (high BAS) donate a larger amount if the plead is framed positively,
i.e,. “...With funds, it will be able to stay open longer hours for student use and
expand the book collection.” Similarly, subjects who are sensitive to signs of po-
tential punishment (high BIS) donate more under the negatively framed message,
i.e., “...Without funds, it will have to cut down on menu items and increase food
prices.”
In our experimental setting, the honoring is essentially a potential reward, there-
fore, subjects with high BAS should be less affected by testosterone in the honor
treatment compared to subjects who are less sensitive to rewards (low BAS). This is
because subjects who are more reward oriented are already highly responsive to the
honor incentive even without the testosterone intake. The finding from Hermans
et al. (2010) is also inline with the hypothesis. The authors find that the effect of
testosterone on reward responsiveness is stronger for subjects with low BAS. On
the other hand, shaming is a potential punishment. Similar arguments as in BAS
lead to the hypothesis that subjects with high BIS are less affected by testosterone
in the shame treatment compared to subjects who are less sensitive to punishments
(low BIS). The BIS/BAS scale is from Carver and White (1994) and the items are
coded so that higher BIS and BAS indicates higher sensitivity to punishment and
reward stimuli.13
Hypothesis 5a. The effect of testosterone administration on the treatment effect
is lower for subjects who are more motived by BIS in the shame treatment.
Hypothesis 5b. The effect of testosterone administration on the treatment effect
is lower for subjects who are more motived by BAS in the honor treatment.
3.4 Results
Figure 3.4 shows the histogram of the treatment effect, defined as the number of
‘T’s find in the honor or shame condition minus the number of ‘T’s find in the
13We use drive and reward seeking of the BAS scale in the analyses. Results are similar if use
the all the sub-scales of BAS.
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baseline condition.14 The distribution of treatment effect is very similar between the
testosterone and placebo group for both the honor (a) and shame (b) treatments
(Mann-Whitney U tests, p > 0.61 for both shame and honor treatments). These
findings are in contrast with the first hypothesis, which states that treatment effect
should be higher for the testosterone group.
Note that subject’s effort in the baseline treatment is similar between the Testos-
terone and Placebo group (Mann-Whitney U test, p > 0.84. We pooled the baseline
treatment from the honor and shame treatment because subjects were unaware of
the honor or shame condition when performing the baseline condition.) Since there
is no reputation incentive in the baseline treatment, and subjects are not informed
about the content of the next part of the experiment, this finding provides suggestive
evidence that testosterone does not make individuals less altruistic.15
Figure 3.4: Histogram of the treatment effect in honor and shame treatments
(a) Honor treatment (b) Shame treatment
Notes: Treatment effect is defined as the number of Ts found in the honor or shame condition minus the number of
Ts found in the baseline condition.
The results regarding hypothesis 2 are presented in figure 3.5. The figure shows
the effect of testosterone on the treatment effect, broken down by a median split of
the 2D:4D ratio (we use the median split to reduce noise of the data). As discussed in
14We dropped a subject who made an extremely negative treatment effect in the honor treatment.
She stated that she felt very nervous in the honor treatment and lost focus. Since she was in the
placebo group, including her in the analyses is actually in favor of our hypothesis.
15Note that we have 37 subjects in the Placebo group and 39 subjects in the Testosterone group.
The number of subjects required for the one-side Mann-Whitney U test to have a power of 0.8
under the 5% significance level and an expected donation difference of 20% is about 30 for each
group.
60
3.4. Results 3. Does testosterone foster reputation concerns?
the hypotheses section, we expect that testosterone has a stronger effect for subjects
with high prenatal testosterone exposure (low 2D:4D ratio) compared to subjects
with low prenatal testosterone exposure (high 2D:4D ratio). Subfigure (a) shows
the result from the honor treatment. Although the treatment effect is higher for the
testosterone group for both high and low of the 2D:4D ratio, the difference is slightly
larger for the low ratio subjects. This pattern is consistent with our hypothesis.
The results are clearer in the shame treatment (subfigure (b)). It illustrates that
testosterone only has a positive effect for subjects with lower 2D:4D ratio. We
use OLS regression with bootstrap standard errors (999 replications) to test the
significance of the interaction effects.16 The dependent variable is the treatment
effect; the independent variables are dummy for testosterone group, dummy for
2D:4D ratio based on median split, and their interaction term. The results are
presented in column 1 (honor treatment) and 2 (shame treatment) of table 3.2.
Although the signs are consistent with the hypothesis, none of the coefficients reaches
significance.17
Figure 3.6 presents the results for hypothesis 3. It illustrates the differential
effect of testosterone on the treatment effect for subjects with intermediate values
of 2D:4D ratio and relatively extreme values of 2D:4D ratio. Bran˜as-Garza et al.
(2013) find that the former group is more altruistic than the latter. Thus, we expect
that testosterone has a stronger effect for subjects with relatively extreme values of
2D:4D ratio. The result from the honor treatment is shown in subfigure (a). The
difference in treatment effect between the testosterone group and placebo group is
indeed higher for subjects with extreme values of 2D:4D. The result from the shame
treatment (subfigure (b)) is similar. However, regression results shown in table 3.2
(column 3 is honor treatment and 4 is shame treatment) suggest that the difference
is not statistically significant.
The results regarding hypothesis 4 are shown in figure 3.7. The figure demon-
16We use bootstrap standard errors due to the small number of observations and we cannot
ensure the normality of the data.
17Note that it is also possible to separate the first part (baseline condition) and the second part
(honor or shame treatment). There are two different methods. The first is using the amount of
donation in each condition as the dependent variable instead of using the treatment effect. We did
not choose this specification because in this case, we need another dummy variable for the honor
and shame condition. This will lead to three way interaction terms, which is hard to interpret. The
second method is to run separate regressions for the baseline condition and the honor or shame
condition. We performed this exercise, however, most of the results are not significant. The above
argument is true for all the regression results presented in table 3.2.
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Figure 3.5: 2D:4D Ratio (Digit Ratio)
(a) Honor treatment (b) Shame treatment
Notes: The figure shows the effect of testosterone on the treatment effect, broken down by a median split of the
digit ratio (we use the median split to reduce noise of the data).
Figure 3.6: 2D:4D Ratio (Digit Ratio) – Distance from the median
(a) Honor treatment (b) Shame treatment
Notes: The figure shows the effect of testosterone on the treatment effect, broken down by a median split of the
distance between ones 2D:4D to the median value of the ratio.
strates the effect of testosterone on treatment effect broken down by the social
desirability scale.18 The scale assesses people’s tendency to make socially desir-
able responses to questionnaire questions, which also reflects people’s sensitivity to
shame. We hypothesize that testosterone has a weaker effect on subjects who have
an inherently high level of shame aversion, because these individuals are more moti-
vated by the threat of being publicly ‘ashamed’ even in the absence of testosterone
administration. According to figure 3.7, the effect of testosterone on the treat-
18Here, we use the self deception sub-scale of the questionnaire.
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ment effect is stronger for subjects who inherently care less about being ‘ashamed’
and weaker for subjects who are more shame averse. Moreover, according to the
regression results in table 3.2 column 5, the testosterone main effect is positively
significant and the interaction term is negatively significant, which is congruent with
the hypothesis.
Figure 3.7: Social Desirability
Notes: The figure shows the effect of testosterone on the treatment effect, broken down by a median split of the
Social Desirability scale.
Figure 3.8 (a) shows result for hypothesis 5a. Since being publicly identified as
the least donator is a thread to one’s social image, we expect that subjects who
have a more sensitive BIS are less affected by testosterone. This is because high
BIS subjects will respond stronger to the potential punishment even without the
testosterone administration. In line with the hypothesis, the effect of testosterone
on the treatment effect is positive only for low BIS subjects. However, regression
results in table 3.2 column 6 suggest that this difference is not significant.
Subjects with a higher BAS score are approach-oriented and respond strongly
to potential rewards. Since being appraised as the most generous donator is a
reward, the hypothesis is that subjects who have a more sensitive BAS are less
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affected by testosterone. The result is illustrated in figure 3.8 (b). According to the
figure, the testosterone group’s treatment effect is higher than the placebo group
only for subjects with lower BAS, which is consistent with the hypothesis. However,
regression results in table 3.2 column 7 suggest that this difference is not significant.
Figure 3.8: Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral Activation System
(BAS)
(a) BIS (b) BAS
Notes: The figure shows the effect of testosterone on the treatment effect, broken down by a median split of the
BIS/BAS scale.
3.5 Discussion
Our main hypothesis states that testosterone causes individuals to care more about
their social image. Therefore, the difference in donation between the honor (shame)
and baseline condition should be larger for the testosterone group in comparison
to the placebo group. However, our results do not support this hypothesis. There
are several factors that might contribute to the null finding, and we discuss each of
them in this section.
First of all, the task might be too interesting or enjoyable to perform. Indeed,
about 82% subjects stated that they enjoyed a little or enjoyed very much of the
real effort task, while only 4 out of 76 subjects stated that they did not enjoy
the task. As a consequence, subjects bear less or even no cost in performing the
task. Since people have a desire to work on interesting tasks even in the absence of
extra incentives (Fehr and Falk, 2002), subjects in our experiment might focus on
playing the real effort task instead of the reputation incentives that we intended to
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Table 3.2: Regressions for the interaction effects
Digit Ratio Digit Ratio from Median Social Desirability BIS BAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Honor Shame Honor Shame Shame Shame Honor
Testosterone 11.02 4.423 5.167 -25.60 40.52* 16.15 18.64
(23.23) (29.54) (17.85) (29.09) (22.98) (29.80) (28.02)
Digit Ratio -11.81 6.469
(24.92) (22.52)
T x Digit Ratio -4.141 -8.844
(33.04) (38.32)
Digit Ratio (From -2.500 3.812
Median) (40.55) (28.23)
T x Digit Ratio 3.500 44.22
(From Median) (45.73) (34.53)
Social Desirability 53.45***
(17.36)
T x Social -78.97***
Desirability (29.20)
BIS -18.44
(21.79)
T x BIS -17.43
(36.11)
BAS 28.31
(20.14)
T x BAS -27.54
(31.31)
Constant 76.56*** 104.1*** 73.50*** 104.5*** 78.09*** 113.2*** 59.86***
(13.99) (11.67) (10.18) (27.00) (12.73) (12.31) (19.77)
Observations 28 48 28 48 48 48 28
Notes: The dependent variable is the treatment effect. Testosterone is a dummy variable indicating treatment
status. T is abbreviation for testosterone and “T x xxx” are the interaction terms between T and other variables.
The others variables are dummies constructed by a median split of the relevant scales in order to reduce noise.
OLS regressions. Bootstrap standard errors (999 replications) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
manipulate. It is interesting to investigate whether using more effortful real effort
tasks will yield different results.
Secondly, all of our participants were females, because the 4-hour lag for the sin-
gle sublingual administration of 0.5mg of testosterone to have a neurophysiological
effect is only known for women. It might be the case that females are more likely to
conform to the majority (Dwenger et al., 2016; Eagly et al., 1981). In our setting,
not getting honored and not getting shamed are both the majority outcome, there-
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fore, the aversion of being singled out might be too strong so that there is no more
room for the effect of testosterone. In a similar manner, Jones and Linardi (2012)
find that females suffer disutility from both negative and positive reputation in the
context of charity donations. Future work, wielded with the understanding of the
time lag for males, might find significant results.
Last, the null result might due to lack of statistical power. We have 29 subjects in
the honor treatment and 48 in the shame treatment. Power analyses discussed in the
experiment design section suggest that the shame treatment has the power to detect
a large effect but is underpowered to detect a small effect, and the honor treatment
is underpowered. The results regarding the differential effect of testosterone on
different characteristics (hypotheses 2 - 5) provide evidence supporting this claim,
as most of the results are in line with the hypotheses but fail to reach significance.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether testosterone increases people’s reputation con-
cern’s in the context of charitable donation. The results suggest that although
subjects put more effort in the honor and shame condition relative to the baseline
condition, the difference in the increment is not significant between the testosterone
and placebo group.
We also investigate the differential effect of testosterone on reputation concerns
based on different characteristics such as the sensitivity to testosterone intake, level
of altruism, and inherent level of reputation concerns etc. While most of the sign of
the results are congruent with our hypotheses, they fail to reach significance at any
conventional level.
We believe that whether testosterone leads to reputation based pro-social be-
havior is an interesting open question. Future work should recruit male subjects,
conduct more effortful tasks, and recruit more participants to fill this gap. We also
believe that whether the effect of testosterone on reputation concerns differ across
gender is an exciting area for future research.
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Chapter 4
The Virtue of Honor and the
Power of Shame – an Experiment
on Charitable Donations
4.1 Introduction
In 2013, there were nearly one million registered charity organizations in the US.1
They provide aids and services in improving many aspects of our lives and make
vital contributions to the well-functioning of our societies. Private donation is the
main funding source for charities to keep providing these valuable services. But
why do people give? Why do people work hard to earn money but give part of it
to unrelated individuals? Andreoni (2006) argues that philanthropy is one of the
greatest puzzles in economics.
This paper contributes to the literature that tries to discover the various moti-
vations underlying giving behavior. In particular, we aim to investigate whether it
is the pursuit of honor, avoidance of shame, or the combination of both that underly
people’s charitable behavior. Understanding the effect of the two different motives
is important. First, from the donators perspective, if the main reason to donate or
donate a higher amount than intended is to avoid the social pressure or the feeling
of shame of being the least donator, then the common practice of ranking dona-
tors might make people worse off.2 Second, whether the practice of shaming can
1From National Center for Charitable statistics Non-Profit sector in Brief 2015.
2DellaVigna et al. (2012) find that there is considerable social pressure cost to turn down a
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foster pro-social behavior has important implications for policy makers. Previous
studies have discovered that providing monetary incentives to motivate pro-social
activities backfires in the case of blood donation (Titmuss, 1970; Mellstro¨m and
Johannesson, 2008) and working for charity organizations (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000; Ariely et al., 2009). This is because the provision of extrinsic incentives to
pro-social behavior might dilute the intrinsic or reputation value of that behavior
(Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). Based on the findings in the psychology literature that
not only moral transgressions but also non-moral activities can induce the feeling
of shame (Tangney et al., 1996), shaming ‘non-compliers’ might be an effective way
to boost pro-social behavior. Lastly, understand the effect of the two motives is im-
portant for charitable organizations to design more efficient fundraising campaigns.
If the main motivation to donate is the pursuit of honor, charitable organizations
should only public very generous donators. On the other hand, if the main drive is
the avoidance of shame, charitable organizations should design indirect and subtle
campaigns to utlilize this fact. Nonetheless, this does not imply that charity orga-
nizations should ‘shame’ individuals who donate less as charities face competition
in attracting donators in the first place.
In our experimental setting, subjects participated in a real effort task to generate
money for charity organizations. The effects of honor and shame were distinguished
in three experimental conditions. In the honor condition, the top two donators were
identified to other subjects while others’ decisions were kept in private. Similarly, in
the shame condition, only the least two donators were identified. Subjects’ behaviors
in these two conditions were compared to the baseline condition in which every
subject’s donation was private information. There was also a self condition, in
which subjects could make money for themselves.3 We designed a novel ceremony
to publicly identify the subjects who donated the most and the least. The ceremony
takes advantage of the common procedure of paying experimental subjects. After
subjects finished the real effort task as well as a post experimental questionnaire,
we asked all of them to come in front of the lab with their signed receipts to wait for
their payments. Subjects who were honored or shamed hold yellow receipts and had
their payment in yellow envelopes, while other subjects’ receipts and envelopes were
in white. To make sure everyone notice who was identified, we required subjects to
solicitor.
3See the experimental design section for a discussion of why we include the self condition.
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remain in the front of the lab until everyone received their payments.
Results from non-parametric tests and regressions indicate that donations made
in the honor and shame condition are about 4% and 3% higher, respectively, than
the baseline condition. These results imply that the pursuit of honor and avoidance
of shame are both important motivations underlying charitable behavior. We also
investigate the differential effect of reputation incentives based on subjects’ char-
acteristics. The results indicate that subjects who care about their social status,
measured by the concern for reputation scale (De Cremer and Tyler, 2005), put more
effort in honor and shame conditions relative to the baseline condition. Participants
who dislike negative judgments from others, measured by the fear of negative evalua-
tion scale (Leary, 1983), put more effort in the shame condition. Moreover, subjects
who were better at the real effort task, measured by their performance in the self
condition, put more effort in the honor condition to compete for the ‘price’. Last,
our main results still hold if we transform the data structure into a between subjects
design. This is accomplished by dropping the data from the second condition in each
session. Since the baseline and honor (shame) conditions are always the first two
conditions and their order were counter balanced, dropping the second condition
makes the experimental setting essentially equivalent to a between subjects design.4
The fact that our results are robust under the between subjects specification sug-
gests that the findings are less likely been driven by the experimenter demanding
effect (Zizzo, 2010).
The present paper contributes to the large literature on analyzing the underlying
motivations of charitable behavior (see Andreoni (2006) and Vesterlund (2006) for
reviews). Researchers have offered several models trying to explain this puzzling
behavior. In the early literature, economists assume that charitable giving is moti-
vated by pure altruism (Schwartz, 1970; Young, 1982; Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984).
However, applying this model to analyze charitable behavior yields predictions that
are vastly different to what we observe in reality (Andreoni, 1988).5 In order to bet-
ter explain the underlying motives of charitable giving, Andreoni (1990) proposed
the “warm-glow” model, in which people do not only care for the total provision of
the public good but also gain intrinsic value if the donation is made by themselves.
4The self condition was always the third and last condition.
5The pure altruism model predicts that first, government contribution will crowd out private
contributions dollar-for-dollar, only the richest will donate as the economy grows, and the average
donation will diminish to zero.
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Recent theories, taking into the account the fact that most charity organizations of-
ten publicly acknowledge donors, propose that people donate because it grants them
prestige or reputation (Harbaugh, 1998). According to the model, prestige might
enter people’s utility function in two different ways. One is intrinsic, which means
that people simply enjoy the feeling of gaining social approval or social status. The
other is instrumental: being famous might increases one’s income or business op-
portunities. In a similar model, Glazer and Konrad (1996) proposes that donation
is a signaling device to boast ones wealth. In this case, donation is equivalent to
conspicuous consumptions in that they demonstrate ones social status (Moav and
Neeman, 2010; Charles et al., 2009).
Evidence from numerous lab and field experiments is consistent with the pres-
tige model (see Andreoni and Petrie (2004); Rege and Telle (2004); Van Vugt and
Hardy (2010); Ariely et al. (2009); Kataria and Regner (2015); Karlan and Mc-
Connell (2014); Reinstein and Riener (2012) for lab experiments and Soetevent
(2005); Alp´ızar et al. (2008); Alp´ızar and Martinsson (2013); List et al. (2004) for
field experiments.) The general finding is that in the ‘public’ treatment, in which
each subject’s donation or contribution is made public to other participants, the
amount of donation or contribution is significantly higher than the baseline treat-
ment, in which all decisions are kept private.6 One caveat of this design is that
subjects who do not care for gaining social status but dislike social disapproval (be-
ing the person who donated the least) also have the motive to increase their donation
in the ‘public’ treatment, since participant’s donation or contribution is revealed to
others regardless of the amount. Consequently, it is unclear whether it is the pursuit
of honor, avoidance of shame, or the combination of both that drive the results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is the experimental
6One notable exception is Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), who find that subjects give less in a
dictator game in which their decisions are made publicly in front of other participants. However,
the paper differs from the donation literature and our paper in several aspects. One important
difference is that the recipients of the dictator game in Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) were the
dictator’s classmates, whereas the recipients in the donation experiments are usually charitable
organizations. It is reasonable to assume that the social ties are stronger among classmates and
this might explain why they find different results. Moreover, the dictators were informed about
the gender of the recipients, which might also influence their behavior. In the case of charitable
donations, on the other hand, gender of the recipients usually does not play an role since the
donations are made to charitable organizations. And last, the money allocated to the recipients
has direct consequence to dictator’s earning in the dictator game, whereas in our experiment, all
money are donated to charity.
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design. Section 4.3 presents the results and section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Experimental Design
We conducted 12 sessions in total in March 2015 at the Royal Holloway, Univer-
sity of London Experimental lab (ExpReSS Lab). A total of 133 students were
recruited via ORSEE from the subject pool. Subjects came from various disciplines
at Royal Holloway. The study was performed in accordance with the Concordat to
Support Research Integrity and was approved by Royal Holloway Research Ethnics
Committee.
Before each session starts, subjects were informed that they might be publicly
identified to other lab participants based on their decisions in the study. They were
also informed that their names would be listed outside the experimental lab. We
emphasized that if they felt uncomfortable about this procedure, they can receive
their show-up fee and leave. All subjects were comfortable to proceed and no one
left during the experiment.
The real effort task was programmed in Matlab and the questionnaire was issued
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All the instructions were written in neutral words
to avoid framing affects.7
4.2.1 The real effort task
In the experiment, subjects participated in a real effort task to earn money for
charity. We opt to use a real effort task instead of a monetary windfall because
we believe that the real effort task is more similar to real life situations, in which
individuals need to work to earn money and donate part of their earnings to charity.
Additionally, studies have documented that subjects behave more selfishly when
their endowment was earned via a real effort task compared to windfall money in
dictator games (Cherry et al., 2002) and in the context of charitable donations
(Carlsson et al., 2013).
The real effort task is based on Kroemer et al. (2014). It consists 12 periods. In
each period, subjects are given 30 seconds to press the ‘LEFT’ key of the computer
7See Appendix A.2 for the experimental instructions for the honor treatment. The instructions
for the shame treatment is very similar and is available upon request.
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mouse as fast as possible. After each period, subjects need to hit the ‘SPACE’
bar to continue to the next. We choose this task for several reasons. First, it
does not require any prior knowledge. Second, it is very simple and hence there is
little learning possibility. Third, the task is boring and effortful, therefore costly to
perform. And last, the output of the task has no value to the experimenter. This
rules out the possibility that subjects perform the task in order to reciprocate the
payments made by the experimenter.
We employ four different payoff levels: each click may worth 1, 3, 6, or 10
points.8 There are three rounds for each payoff level and the order is randomly
decided for each subject. Before each period starts, information about the payoff
level of the current period will appear on subjects’ computer screen (see figure 4.1).
Additionally, to prevent subjects from loosing time due to distracted attention, a
count down from three to one is launched before each period starts. Since clicking
generates a lot of noise, subject’s effort might be affected by others due to peer
effects or conformity. To control for this, we ask subjects to put on a headset and
listen to soft music. This design ensures that subjects can progress at their own
pace without receiving disturbance from other participants. All the points subjects
earned in the real effort task are exchanged to British Pound Sterling at rate: 100
points = 2 Cents.
4.2.2 Experimental Conditions and Treatments
There are a total of four experimental conditions in our experimental setting, namely,
baseline condition, shame condition, honor condition, and self condition. Subjects
cannot earn money for themselves in baseline, honor, and shame conditions. All
money are donated to charity. This design ensures that subject’s donation is driven
by altruistic or reputation concerns, not monetary incentives. Additionally, the
presence of monetary incentives might crowd out donation because observers are
not sure whether the donation is for good deeds or for money (Be´nabou and Tirole,
2006; Ariely et al., 2009). Since all money are donated to charity in these conditions,
we refer to these conditions as donation conditions.
In the baseline condition, the amount of donation is kept in private. In this case,
8This design allows us to investigate whether subject’s behavior in the real effort task is rational
or not. Since effort is costly, a efficient strategy is to put less effort in lower payoff levels. This is
indeed what we find (see figure A.1 in the Appendix A.1)
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Figure 4.1: Information screen before each period starts
reputation concerns do not have any effect on the amount of donation. Warm-glow
(Andreoni, 1990) and sympathy towards the recipients are the two main reasons to
donate in the baseline condition. In the honor condition, only the top two donators
are publicly identified, while other participants remain anonymous. Please note
that we only reveal the identity of the two top donators.9 Neither the amount of
donation nor their chosen charity is revealed. Individuals who care about social
status or prestige have extra incentives to make higher donations in order to be
‘honored’. On the other hand, subjects who are not motivated by gaining social
status do not need to increase their donations to avoid social disapproval because
their donations are not publicized. The shame condition is the same as the honor
condition, with the exception that the least two donators are publicly identified. In
the shame condition, the aversion of shame or social pressure is the extra motivation
for people to donate more than the baseline condition. These three conditions allow
us to isolate the effect of honor and shame on charitable behavior.
Subjects can earn money for themselves in the self condition and the amount
they earn is private information. We implement the self condition for two reasons.
First, the money they earn in the self condition can serve as an indicator for their
ability in performing the task under the rather general assumption that subjects will
9There were about 11 subjects in each session, for both the honor and shame treatments.
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try to earn as much as they can.10 Second, when subject’s donation in the honor
condition is similar to the shame condition, their performance in the self condition
is important to distinguish whether they reached a physical limit or the effect of
shame and honor is indeed similar.
We implement a within–between subjects 2x2 design. The honor treatments
consist baseline, honor, and self conditions (note that each condition consists of
12 periods of clicking.) The shame treatments consist baseline, shame, and self
condition. The within element of our design is that subjects participate in both
baseline and honor (or shame) conditions in each session. To control for order effects,
the sequence of the baseline and honor (shame) conditions are counter balanced.
Note that the self condition is always the last condition. The between element
is that subjects only perform one of the honor and shame treatments. The four
experimental treatments are summarized in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary of Experimental Treatments
Normal Order Reverse Order
Honor Treatment Baseline – Honor – Self (34) Honor – Baseline – Self (32)
Shame Treatment Baseline – Shame – Self (36) Shame – Baseline – Self (31)
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are number of subjects in each treatment.
4.2.3 Honoring and Shaming ceremony
We designed a novel honoring and shaming ceremony, which we believe is less artifi-
cial than methods used in other papers, such as showing participants’ contributions
and their names (and photos) on computer screens (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004;
Samek and Sheremeta, 2014), discussing their donations in front of other partic-
ipants (Ariely et al., 2009), and asking participants to write their name on the
blackboard under the word “I donated the most (least)” (Jacquet et al., 2011).
The ceremony takes advantage of the common procedure of paying experimental
subjects. After subjects finish all the conditions as well as a post-experimental
questionnaire, we ask all of them to come to the front of the lab with their signed
receipt and await their payments. Subjects who are honored or shamed hold yellow
10This is very likely the case in our setting because subjects can only make money for themselves.
More importantly, subject’s decision does not affect other subjects, therefore, social preferences do
not play a role.
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receipts and have their payment in yellow envelopes, while others’ receipts and
envelopes are in white.
To make sure everyone notices which subjects are identified, we ask subjects to
remain in the front of the lab until everyone receives their payment. Because all the
subjects are required to come to the front of the lab and stand in front of others,
this design can control for the ‘exposure aversion’ effect, in which some subjects
dislike being exposed in front of others. Jones and Linardi (2014) find that there is
a type of individuals that possess ‘Wallflower’ preferences. Subjects who have this
preference tend to avoid being honored as well as being shamed, in other words,
they dislike any kind of public exposure. The presence of this type of preference will
underestimate the effect of honor and overestimate the effect of shame. Subjects
are free to leave after all of them get their payments.
In order to make the honoring and shaming more formal and credible, we also
inform subjects that we will make a public list of participants and post the list
outside the Royal Holloway experimental Lab. The name of those who get honored
or shamed in each session will be highlighted in yellow.
4.2.4 Experimental Procedure
After subjects arrived at the lab and agreed to proceed, we conducted a ‘meet and
greet’ stage in order to create some social connections amongst subjects. Subjects
who sat in the same row were asked to chat with each other. To help them ‘break the
ice’, the experimenter announced in public that they could exchange their names,
field of study, where they came from, and their hobbies. The ‘meet and greet’ stage
lasted about five minutes. Any communication between subjects was prohibited
after this stage. Afterwards, the instructions for the first condition were handed
out to the subjects. They needed to answer the control questions correctly in order
to proceed. Moreover, subjects received a list of ten charitable organizations with
descriptions. This list incorporated popular charities and not-for-profit organiza-
tions in the UK. Subjects were asked to choose one preferable organization. Before
the actual task began, subjects had four practice rounds, one for each pay level, to
familiarize themselves with the real effort task. Participants knew that the session
consists of several parts, but they did not know the content of the future parts before
the corresponding instructions were provided.
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The honoring and shaming stage was the very last part of the experiment, af-
ter they finished all three conditions and a questionnaire. No feedback about their
performance was given until they completed all the conditions and the post exper-
imental questionnaire. This design ensures that subject’s behavior in the second
condition is not affected by the outcome of the first condition.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Identification
Since subjects participated in both the baseline and honor (or shame) condition in
each session, the dependent variable of interest is the treatment effect, defined as
the amount of donation made in the honor or shame condition minus the amount
of donation made in the baseline condition. The treatment effect is able to iden-
tify subjects’ reputation concerns, while at the same time control for a number of
individual specific unobservables.
Suppose that subject’s donation in the baseline condition is determined by the
following equation:
DonationBaselinei = Ai + Wi + ui (4.1)
where Ai denotes subject i’s ability in performing the task, Wi represents i’s intrinsic
value of donation (warm glow), and ui is other unobservables that might affect i’s
donation. In the honor or shame condition, everything remains the same except
that reputation concerns might also affect their behavior. This can be modeled as:
DonationHonor or Shamei = Ai + Wi + Ri + ui (4.2)
where Ri denotes i’s reputation concern. The treatment effect is calculated from
subbstracting equation 4.1 from equation 4.2. The unobservables such as ability
and intrinsic motivation are canceled out, and the remaining term, Ri, represents
subject i’s reputation concern.11
11The order of the conditions might affect our results. In particular, subject’s behavior in the
baseline condition when the order is baseline – honor (or shame) might be different from their
behavior when the order is reversed. We discuss this in detail in the robustness check subsection
and show that order has minimal affect on subject’s behavior .
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4.3.2 The Effect of Honor and Shame
Table 4.2 presents the average amount of money subjects made in each condition.
The unit is in British Pence. Column (1) and (2) shows the result for the honor
treatments and shame treatments respectively.12 The treatment effect is significantly
higher than zero in both the honor and shame treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 3.312, p = 0.0009, N = 66 for honor treatments; Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 2.511, p = 0.0120, N = 67 for the shame treatments). Specifically, subject’s
donation in the honor condition is about 4.1% higher than the baseline condition.
The difference is 3.5% in the shame treatments.
Moreover, donation in the honor and shame conditions is not significantly dif-
ferent from each other (Mann-Whitney U test, z = 0.506, p = 0.6127, N = 133).
The similar amount of donation in the honor and shame conditions is not due to the
fact that subjects reach their physical limit in either conditions, as demonstrated by
the fact that subjects perform even better in the self condition. Their performance
in self condition is 3.9% higher than the honor condition (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, z = 4.162, p = 0.0000, N = 66) and is 6.1% higher than the shame condition
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 4.348, p = 0.0000, N = 67).
Table 4.2: Average amount of money made in each condition
(1) (2)
Honor treatments Shame treatments
Baseline condition 229.3 (45.7) 229.5 (47.5)
Honor condition 238.6 (48.9) - -
Shame condition - - 237.5 (44.9)
Self condition 247.8 (51.0) 251.9 (43.8)
N 66 67
Notes: The variable is the mount of money subjects generated in Baseline, Honor, Shame, and Self conditions. The
unit is British Pence. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
We also investigate the proportion of subjects who achieve a positive treatment
effect. If subjects in our experiment are not motivated by reputation concerns but
click randomly instead, the proportion of subjects who make a positive treatment
effect should not be significantly different from 50%. This is not the case. We find
12We separately report the baseline donation in the honor and shame treatments as subjects
participated in both baseline and honor (shame) conditions and the statistical tests are based on
paired tests.
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that more subjects exert a positive treatment effect in both the honor and shame
treatments. In the honor treatments, 68.18% of the subjects achieve a positive
treatment effect, which is significantly higher than 50% (Binomial test, p = 0.0043,
N = 66). The proportion in the shame treatments is 70.1% and is also higher than
50% (Binomial test, p = 0.0007, N = 67). Additionally, we find that the proportion
is similar in honor and shame treatments (Two-sample test of proportions, z =
0.2457, p = 0.8059, N = 133.)
4.3.3 The Effect of Reputation Concerns on Different Char-
acteristics.
We have shown that subjects respond to image incentives by increasing their effort
in the honor and shame conditions relative to the baseline condition. But who
are more affected by the reputation incentives? In this subsection, we show that
characteristics such as concern for reputation, fear of negative evaluation, and ability
in performing the task have profound influences on subject’s behavior.
Subjects who value their social status relatively more than others should try
harder in the honor and shame conditions to gain status and to avoid the lost
of reputation, respectively. We test this hypothesis using the 7-item Concern for
Reputation Scale (De Cremer and Tyler, 2005), which was administrated after the
real effort tasks and before the honoring and shaming ceremony. We find that
treatment effect and the Concern for Reputation Scale is positively correlated in
both the honor and shame treatments (Spearman Correlation, Rho = 0.2818, p =
0.0219 for honor treatments and Rho = 0.2393, p = 0.0512 for shame treatments.)
This means subjects who care more about social status increase their donation
more from the baseline condition to the honor or shame condition compared to
subjects who care relatively less about their social image. We further break down
the sample by a median split of the scale and investigate the treatment effect for
each sub-group. The results are shown in figure 4.2. The left panel is the data
from the shame treatment.13 For subjects who relatively care less about reputation
13For illustration purpose, we exclude two outliers in this bar graph. These two outliers were
both in the shame treatment. One of them had a very high treatment effect while the other had
a very low treatment effect. Including these two subjects will make the 95% interval very wide
but does not affect the mean. Please note that the two outliers only affects the appearance of the
graph, we therefore include them in the following statistical tests.
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(reputation scale below median), the treatment effect is not significantly different
from zero (two sided t-test, t = 0.0417, p = 0.9670, N = 27).14 On the other
hand, for subjects who care more about reputation (scale is higher than median),
the treatment effect is significantly higher than zero (two sided t-test, t = 3.1313,
p = 0.0033, N = 40). Results from the honor treatments (right panel) are similar.
Treatment effect is not significantly different from zero for subjects whose Concern
for Reputation Scale is below median (two sided t-test, t = 1.3110, p = 0.1995,
N = 32). For subjects whose Concern for Reputation Scale is above median, the
treatment effect is significantly larger than zero (two sided t-test, t = 3.6613, p =
0.0009, N = 34).
Figure 4.2: Treatment effect by median split of reputation concern scale
Notes: Treatment effect is defined as the amount of donation made in honor or shame condition minus the amount
of donation made in baseline condition. Below and above median implies whether subject’s score from the concern
for reputation scale is below or above median. For illustration purpose, we exclude two outliers in this bar graph.
These two outliers are both in the shame treatment. One of them had a very high treatment effect while the other
had a very low treatment effect. Including these two subjects will make the 95% interval very wide but does not
affect the average. Please note that the two outliers only affects the appearance of the graph, we therefore include
them in the statistical tests.
14We use t-test here because 95% confidence intervals are used in the bar graph. Please note
that the results are the same if we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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Another natural hypothesis is that subjects who dislike receiving negative eval-
uation should try harder in the shame condition to avoid being the least donator.
Using the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (Leary, 1983), we show that the results
are consistent with the hypothesis. Subjects’ scores on the scale are positively cor-
related with the treatment effect for the shame treatment (Spearman Correlation,
Rho = 0.2214, p = 0.0718).15 The results are the same if we divide the subjects
by a median split of the scale (figure 4.3).16 According to the bar graph, subjects
who dislike negative evaluation have a treatment effect significantly larger than zero
(two sided t-test, t = 2.5205, p = 0.0157, N = 41). The treatment effect is not
statistically different from zero for subjects whose scale is below median (two sided
t-test, t = 0.4067, p = 6878, N = 25).17
Subject’s ability in performing the task also affects their responsiveness to the
image incentive. If subjects form correct beliefs about their own ability compar-
ative to other participants, then, in the honor treatments, only subjects who are
good at this task have the incentive to compete for the ‘price’. Similarly, in the
shame treatments, only subjects who are bad at this task should try harder to avoid
the ‘stigma’. We use subject’s performance in the self condition as their ability
measure.18 We find that the treatment effect and ability is positively correlated in
the honor treatments (Spearman correlation, Rho=0.2945, p=0.0164, N = 66) but
not in the shame treatments (Spearman correlation, Rho = -0.0702, p = 0.5722,
N = 67). In the following, we break down the sample by a median split of ability
measure and report the average treatment effect for each sub-group. Under this
specification, the result from the shame treatment is congruent with the hypothesis.
The results are presented in figure 4.4. The left panel is the data from the shame
treatment.19 For subjects who are relatively bad at the task (performance in the self
condition below median), the treatment effect is significantly larger than zero (two
sided t-test, t = 3.0753, p = 0.0046, N = 30).20 On the other hand, for subjects who
15The correlation is not significant in the honor treatment (Spearman Correlation, Rho = 0.1717,
p = 0.1680), which is expected because being honored is not a punishment.
16As explained in figure 4.2, we exclude two outliers for illustration purpose but include them
in the statistical tests.
17The results are the same if we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
18The results are similar if we use the maximum clicks they achieved in the experiment as ability
measure.
19As in figure 4.2 we exclude two outliers in the graph, but include them for statistical tests.
20The results are the same if we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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Figure 4.3: Treatment effect by median split of Fear of negative evaluation scale
Notes: Treatment effect is defined as the amount of donation made in honor or shame condition minus the amount
of donation made in baseline condition. Below and above median implies whether subject’s score from the fear of
negative evaluation scale is below or above median. As explained in figure 4.2, we exclude two outliers for illustration
purpose but include them in the statistical tests.
are more competent (ability measure higher than median), the treatment effect is
not significantly different from zero (two sided t-test, t = 0.6575, p = 0.5151, N =
37). Results from the honor treatments (right panel) are the opposite. For subjects
whose ability is below median, the treatment effect is weakly higher than zero (two
sided t-test, t = 1.7314, p = 0.0922, N = 36). On the other hand, for subjects who
are good at this task, the treatment effect is significantly larger than zero (two sided
t-test, t = 3.0753, p = 0.0046, N = 30).
The findings regarding the differential effects of reputation concerns on subjects’
characteristics are replicated using random effects panel regressions. The results are
presented in table 4.5. Column 1 corresponds to the results presented in figure 4.2.
Concern for Reputation (Dummy) is a dummy variable based on the equal split of
subjects’ scores on the Concern for Reputation Scale. The Honor and Shame coef-
ficients are not significant, suggesting that subjects who care relatively less about
reputation do not put more effort in the honor and shame conditions in comparison
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Figure 4.4: Treatment effect by median split of Ability measure
Notes: Treatment effect is defined as the amount of donation made in honor or shame condition minus the amount
of donation made in baseline condition. The ability measure is based on the amount of money they made for
themselves in the self condition. As explained in figure 4.2, we exclude two outliers for illustration purpose but
include them in the statistical tests.
to the baseline condition. The interaction terms between the scale and the condi-
tional dummies (Honor or Shame X Reputation) are positive but not significant.
However, post regression tests suggest that subjects whose score on the concern
reputation scale is higher than median contribute significantly more in the honor
and shame condition compared to the baseline condition (Chi Square test, p = 0.013
for the Honor; p < 0.01 for Shame).
Column 2 of table 4.5 replicates the result illustrated in figure 4.3. The Shame
is not significant, while the Shame X Fear of Negative Evaluation Dummy is sig-
nificantly positive. This suggests that subjects who dislike others to hold negative
perceptions of themselves tried harder in the shame condition in order to avoid the
stigma.
Column 3 mirrors the result presented in figure 4.4. The Honor coefficient is
not significant while the Honor X Ability is. This indicates that only subjects
who are better at this task actually tried to compete for the “price”. For the
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shame treatment, the situation is the opposite. The Shame coefficient is significantly
positive while its interaction term with Ability is negative (but not significant). This
is congruent with the hypothesis that only subjects who are really bad at this task
need to try harder in the shame condition to avoid being the least donator.
Figure 4.5: Regressions about the differential effects of reputation concerns on sub-
jects’ characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Reputation Fear Ability
Honor Condition 0.435 0.235
(0.551) (0.298)
Shame Condition -0.0379 -0.319 1.090***
(0.882) (0.775) (0.292)
Concern for Reputation (Dummy) -1.353**
(0.684)
Honor X Reputation 0.567
(0.685)
Shame X Reputation 1.272
(0.951)
Fear of Neg. Evaluation (Dummy) -1.876*
(0.998)
Honor X Fear
Shame X Fear 1.579*
(0.921)
Ability (Dummy) 4.559***
(0.540)
Honor X Ability 1.671***
(0.637)
Shame X Ability -1.143
(0.752)
Constant 19.87*** 20.30*** 16.82***
(0.559) (0.817) (0.271)
Observations 3192 1608 3192
Notes: Concern for Reputation (Dummy) is a dummy variable which equals one if the subject scored equal to
or above the median on the concern for reputation scale and equals zero otherwise. Fear of Negative Evaluation
(Dummy) is the median split based on their score on the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale. And the Ability
(Dummy) is based on the median split of the money they made in the self condition. Cluster Standard errors
(individual level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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4.3.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we first show that our main results are robust to the inclusion of a
set of control variables. Second, we present evidence that the order of the conditions
has minimal affect on subject’s behavior. And last, we replicate the main result in
a between subjects design data structure.
The regression results are presented in table 4.3. The dependent variable is the
amount of donation made in each round. In column (1), we only include the honor
and shame condition dummy as independent variables. The honor coefficient implies
that in each round, subjects on average donate 4% more in the honor condition in
comparison to the baseline condition, and the difference is significant at 5%. The
difference is 3.5% for the shame condition, but it is marginally insignificant (p =
0.104). This is due to the two outliers mentioned before in figure 4.2. These two
observations have little effect on average donation but inflate the standard errors
dramatically. After dropping the two outliers in column (2), the shame coefficient
becomes highly significant. We add a set of control variables in column (3). The
controls include pay level effects, round effects, gender, age, the number of partic-
ipants they know, enjoyment of the task, concern for reputation scale, and fear of
negative evaluation scale. Additionally, in order to control for order effects, we add
a dummy variable, Reverse Order, which equals 1 if the order of the treatment is
honor (or shame) – baseline and equals zero otherwise. Both the honor and shame
coefficients remain significant.
We also investigate whether subject’s behavior in the baseline, honor, and shame
condition is affected by the order of the conditions. For example, we compare sub-
ject’s donation in baseline condition when the order is baseline – honor (shame) to
their donation when the order is honor (shame) – baseline. The results indicate that
the order has a minimal effect on subject’s behavior. For baseline and shame condi-
tions, the difference is not significant at any conventional levels (Mann-Whitney U
test, p > 0.29 for the baseline conditions in the honor treatment and in the shame
treatment; p > 0.72 for the shame conditions.) We find that subjects contribute
more in the honor condition when it is the second condition and the difference is
weakly significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.07). Further analyses suggest that
this is driven by session four, which was a honor – baseline treatment. Subjects from
session four had lower ability than others, as they performed significantly worse in
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all conditions, including the self condition. Consequently, they dragged down the av-
erage contribution in the honor condition when the order is honor – baseline. When
we exclude session four from the analyses, the difference vanishes (Mann-Whitney
U test, p > 0.72).
To provide additional evidence that our results are less likely driven by order
effects, we show that our main result still holds in a between subjects structure. This
is accomplished by discarding the data from the second condition in each session.
In this case, subject’s behavior in the baseline, honor, and shame conditions is not
affected by previous experience. The results are shown in table 4.4. The dependent
variable is the amount of clicks in each round divided by the maximum clicks they
achieved throughout the experiment;21 we use this relative measure to control for
subjects’ ability differences.22 The results indicate that the amount of clicks in the
honor condition is 3.08% closer to their best performance compared to the baseline
condition. The result is similar for the shame condition.23
4.4 Conclusion
Previous studies have established the importance of reputation or prestige moti-
vations on people’s charitable behavior. However, these studies remain silent on
which aspect of reputation concerns, namely, pursuit of honor, avoidance of shame,
or the combination of both, is the primary underlying motivation. In this study, by
conducting a real effort experiment and a novel honoring and shaming ceremony,
we aim to disentangle these two effects.
We find that both honor and shame are both important motivations. Donation
made in the honor condition is about 4% higher than the baseline condition and
the donation made in the shame condition is about 3% higher than the baseline
condition. Moreover, donation made in honor and shame conditions are not sig-
nificantly different from each other, which suggests that two motives are equally
21We use clicks instead of donation here because the amount of donation in each round is also
affected by the pay level in that round.
22We also run a fixed effect regression including the self condition, which is another way the take
into account ability heterogeneity. The results are the same.
23The Male coefficient is negative and highly significant. This result suggests that males put
more effort in the self condition related to the donation conditions compared to females. We also
run the regression with honor and shame dummies interact with Gender. The interaction terms
are negative but not significant.
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Table 4.3: Random effects panel regression
(1) (2) (3)
Honor Condition 0.772** 0.676** 0.777***
(0.340) (0.334) (0.209)
Shame Condition 0.678 0.769** 0.625**
(0.417) (0.307) (0.253)
Reverse Order -0.591
(0.587)
Male 2.237***
(0.635)
Concern for Reputation -0.817*
(0.484)
Fear 0.523
(0.389)
Enjoy Task 0.868***
(0.199)
Pay Level 4.055***
(0.0680)
No. of Subjects they Know -0.288
(0.244)
Age -1.504**
(0.628)
Age Squared 0.0307***
(0.0117)
Round 0.114*
(0.0590)
Round Squared -0.00251
(0.00176)
Constant 19.11*** 19.23*** 13.73
(0.336) (0.322) (8.356)
Observations 3192 3144 3144
Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of donation made in each period. Honor condition and Shame condition
are dummy variables. Reverse Order is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the Order of the treatment is Honor
(Shame) – Baseline. Fear refers to the fear of negative evaluation scale. In column 2 we dropped the two outliers
mentioned before (figure 4.2. Cluster Standard errors (individual level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
effective in attracting donations. We also find that subject’s concern for reputation,
fear of negative evaluation, and ability in performing the real effort task predict
86
4.4. Conclusion 4. The Virtue of Honor and the Power of Shame – an Experiment on Charitable Donations
Table 4.4: Random effects panel regression - Between subjects data structure
(1)
Honor Condition 0.0307* (0.0185)
Shame Condition 0.0303* (0.0170)
Male -0.0783*** (0.0179)
Concern for Reputation -0.00118 (0.0120)
Enjoy Task 0.00327 (0.00548)
Fear of Neg. Evaluation -0.0189* (0.0112)
Pay Level 0.00695*** (0.000783)
No. of Subjects they Know -0.000709 (0.00511)
Age -0.0104 (0.0198)
Age Squared 0.000156 (0.000371)
Round -0.0321*** (0.00350)
Round Squared 0.00141*** (0.000163)
Constant 1.151*** (0.262)
Observations 1596
Notes: The dependent variable is the amount of clicks in each round divided by the maximum clicks they achieved
in one round throughout the experiment. Honor condition and Shame condition are dummy variables. Cluster
Standard errors (individual level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
their responsiveness to the reputation incentives.
There are several open questions for future research. First is to investigate the
effect of shame on long term relationships between charity organizations and their
‘customers’. In particular, does the practice of shaming individuals who donate less
than others make organizations worse off in the long run? Second, there are a num-
ber of important motivations underlying charitable behavior, namely, sympathy of
the recipients, warm-glow, pursuit of honor, and aversion of shame. It would be
interesting to investigate the relative importance of these motivations. Last, it is
interesting to test whether shaming can encourage pro-social behavior in other con-
texts, such as blood donation, purchase of low emission vehicles, and volunteering.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Relative Welfare
The relative welfare in the PGG with punishment is presented in figure A.1. The
relative welfare is constructed as the following. We first compute the average payoff
in each period of the no-punishment condition. This is done separately for rice and
non-rice subjects. We then subtract this average from individual’s payoff in the
punishment condition. Finally, the difference is normalized by the average payoff in
the no-punishment condition. This yields the evolution of payoff in the punishment
condition relative to the no-punishment condition.1
Figure A.1: Evolution of relative welfare
Notes: This figure presents the relative welfare in the punishment condition with respect to the no punishment
condition. This is constructed by first calculating the welfare difference between the two conditions and normalize
the difference by the welfare in the no punishment condition.
In the first period of the punishment condition, rice and non-rice subjects earn
1Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) uses the group level average payoff to calculate the relative payoff.
We cannot compare group level difference between the two conditions because subjects randomly
regroup after the no-punishment condition.
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about 10% less compared to the first period of the no punishment condition. The
difference becomes smaller over time and subjects in both regions start to make
a relative payoff gain from period fourteen onwards. Taking all periods together,
the average relative payoff is -2.6% in non-rice and -3.5% in rice. The difference
is not significant at any conventional level (Mann-Whitney U test based on group
level averages: p > 0.72). Moreover, in periods 10 and 11, in which the differ-
ence between rice and non-rice is the largest, the differences are also not significant
(Mann-Whitney U test based on group level averages: p > 0.25 for both periods).
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A.2 Additional Regression Analyses
Table A.1: Tobit Regressions Regarding the Effect of the Percentage of Rice Paddy
fields on Punishment Behavior among Rice Farming Regions.
Rice Regions Non Rice Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perc. Paddy Field (Municipality) 0.0691** 0.0625** -0.0182 -0.0173
(0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0265) (0.0227)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.591 -0.197 -1.381*** -0.941***
(3.854) (3.219) (0.232) (0.258)
Perc. Rice Paddy X Anti-Social Punishment -0.0167 -0.0122 0.0170 0.00216
(0.0468) (0.0410) (0.0347) (0.0319)
Punisher Contribution 0.0517 0.0619
(0.0648) (0.0495)
Punished Contribution -0.0659** -0.0299
(0.0308) (0.0250)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.119** -0.0778**
(0.0601) (0.0355)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) 0.00657 -0.0784
(0.0684) (0.0578)
Holistic Thinking -1.247 -1.417**
(0.841) (0.615)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.167 0.151
(0.387) (0.353)
Relative Income 0.375 0.0240
(0.279) (0.292)
Risk Attitude -0.0464 0.213*
(0.144) (0.121)
Male 1.023* -0.212
(0.536) (0.279)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.0197 -0.174
(0.330) (0.374)
Priming (Dummy) 0.314 0.878**
(0.573) (0.400)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.541 0.0116
(0.555) (0.366)
Collectivistic 0.456 -0.110
(0.520) (0.506)
Individualistic 0.257 0.868**
(0.513) (0.435)
Trustworthy (Belief) -0.110 0.0408
(0.112) (0.108)
Public Order (Belief) 0.0689 -0.0807
(0.0926) (0.0808)
Period -0.688 -0.378 0.151 0.273
(0.708) (0.705) (0.544) (0.520)
Period Squared 0.0234 0.0123 -0.0128 -0.0170
(0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0223) (0.0212)
Constant -1.483 -3.893 -0.915 -3.338
(4.524) (5.051) (3.215) (3.493)
Observations 3534 3534 3985 3985
Notes: The dependent variable is the punishment points assigned to group member who contributed more or less
than the punisher. The Perc. Paddy Field is the percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice paddy fields at
the municipality level. and Anti-Social Punishment is a dummy variable which equals one if the punished subject
contribute more then the punisher. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Random Effects Panel Regressions regarding the contribution in the
PGGs.
PGG without Punishment PGG with Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice 1.086* 1.021* 1.577** 1.437**
(0.583) (0.556) (0.624) (0.581)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0316 0.0464
(0.0596) (0.0608)
Holistic Thinking 1.328* 0.311
(0.766) (0.734)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.275 -0.410
(0.410) (0.412)
Relative Income -0.564** -0.295
(0.279) (0.237)
Risk Attitude 0.0726 0.159
(0.117) (0.106)
Male 2.029*** 2.159***
(0.462) (0.369)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.653* 1.313***
(0.382) (0.392)
Priming (Dummy) -0.468 -0.158
(0.541) (0.567)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.364 -0.0905
(0.478) (0.409)
Collectivistic 0.488 0.676
(0.443) (0.465)
Individualistic -0.629 -0.431
(0.427) (0.388)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.0777 0.123
(0.0897) (0.104)
Public Order (Belef) -0.0336 -0.0448
(0.0922) (0.0796)
Period 1.191*** 1.191*** 2.244*** 2.244***
(0.171) (0.171) (0.301) (0.302)
Period sqaured -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.0746*** -0.0746***
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Constant 7.911*** 7.365*** -4.147** -7.435**
(0.419) (2.544) (1.772) (3.057)
Observations 4112 4112 4112 4112
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution in the PGG without punishment (columns 1 and 2) and with
punishment (columns 3 and 4). Rice is a dummy variable equals one if the subject comes from a Rice farming
province. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Tobit Regressions regarding amount of punishment assigned to free-riders
and cooperators.
PGG without Punishment PGG with Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice 1.086* 1.021* 1.577** 1.437**
(0.583) (0.556) (0.624) (0.581)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.0316 0.0464
(0.0596) (0.0608)
Holistic Thinking 1.328* 0.311
(0.766) (0.734)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.275 -0.410
(0.410) (0.412)
Relative Income -0.564** -0.295
(0.279) (0.237)
Risk Attitude 0.0726 0.159
(0.117) (0.106)
Male 2.029*** 2.159***
(0.462) (0.369)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.653* 1.313***
(0.382) (0.392)
Priming (Dummy) -0.468 -0.158
(0.541) (0.567)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.364 -0.0905
(0.478) (0.409)
Collectivistic 0.488 0.676
(0.443) (0.465)
Individualistic -0.629 -0.431
(0.427) (0.388)
Trustworty (Belief) 0.0777 0.123
(0.0897) (0.104)
Public Order (Belef) -0.0336 -0.0448
(0.0922) (0.0796)
Period 1.191*** 1.191*** 2.244*** 2.244***
(0.171) (0.171) (0.301) (0.302)
Period sqaured -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.0746*** -0.0746***
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Constant 7.911*** 7.365*** -4.147** -7.435**
(0.419) (2.544) (1.772) (3.057)
Observations 4112 4112 4112 4112
Notes: Tobit Regressions. The dependent variable is the punishment points assigned to group members who
contributes less or more than the punisher. Rice is a dummy variable equals one if the subject comes from a Rice
farming province. Anti-Social punishment is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the punished subject contributes
more than the punisher. Cluster Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
93
A. Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A.4: Comparing the Probability of Punishment and the Intensity of Punish-
ment Conditional on Punishing between subjects from rice provinces
Probabiliy of Punishment Intensity of Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zhejiang 0.0641 0.0747 0.0579 -0.158 -0.240 -0.791*
(0.0662) (0.0651) (0.0806) (0.442) (0.429) (0.426)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.141*** -0.0895*** -0.0891*** -0.564 -0.0602 0.0512
(0.0296) (0.0336) (0.0338) (0.377) (0.407) (0.335)
Zhejiang x Anti-Social Punishment -0.0268 -0.0282 -0.0274 0.874 0.980 0.869*
(0.0391) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.593) (0.596) (0.481)
Punisher Contribution 0.00851** 0.00798* 0.0669 0.0333
(0.00423) (0.00429) (0.0537) (0.0452)
Punished Contribution -0.00853*** -0.00858*** -0.0359 -0.0346
(0.00294) (0.00299) (0.0231) (0.0231)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.0167*** -0.0168*** -0.00128 -0.00167
(0.00476) (0.00488) (0.0382) (0.0363)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.00253 0.0471
(0.00748) (0.0394)
Holistic Thinking -0.136 0.222
(0.106) (0.671)
From Rural (Dummy) 0.00435 0.345
(0.0461) (0.326)
Relative Income 0.0200 0.390*
(0.0255) (0.218)
Risk Attitude -0.00121 0.0957
(0.0146) (0.116)
Male 0.0632 1.091***
(0.0440) (0.368)
Natural Science (Dummy) 0.0120 0.0827
(0.0389) (0.291)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0572 -0.317
(0.0592) (0.353)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.0232 -0.385
(0.0440) (0.345)
Collectivistic 0.0266 -0.0895
(0.0537) (0.290)
Individualistic 0.0223 0.155
(0.0507) (0.289)
Trustworthy (Belief) -0.0137 0.00754
(0.0117) (0.0894)
Public Order (Belief) 0.00817 0.0775
(0.00926) (0.0862)
Period -0.0723 -0.0269 -0.0239 0.586 0.558 0.357
(0.0646) (0.0672) (0.0675) (0.527) (0.519) (0.488)
Period Squared 0.00283 0.00125 0.00114 -0.0249 -0.0239 -0.0150
(0.00251) (0.00259) (0.00260) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0195)
Constant 0.841** 0.719* 0.629 -0.692 -1.114 -2.092
(0.407) (0.407) (0.450) (3.033) (3.026) (3.600)
Observations 3534 3534 3534 1223 1223 1223
Notes: Columns 1-3 are Random Effects Linear Probability models and the dependent variable is the probability of
punishing Free-rider and Cooperators. Columns 4-6 are tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the amount
of punishment points assigned to other group member who contributed more or less than the punisher. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Comparing the Probability of Punishment and the Intensity of Punish-
ment Conditional on Punishing between subjects from non-rice provinces
Probabiliy of Punishment Intensity of Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shandong -0.0166 -0.0344 -0.0212 0.322 0.345 0.563**
(0.0491) (0.0506) (0.0566) (0.341) (0.304) (0.223)
Anti-Social Punishment -0.147*** -0.0716** -0.0716** -0.247 0.288 0.289*
(0.0207) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.201) (0.205) (0.174)
Shandong x Anti-Social Punishment 0.0156 0.00369 0.00287 0.201 0.265 0.141
(0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.304) (0.356) (0.298)
Punisher Contribution 0.0129*** 0.0132*** 0.0707* 0.0492*
(0.00449) (0.00455) (0.0426) (0.0270)
Punished Contribution -0.0121*** -0.0117*** -0.0513** -0.0433**
(0.00269) (0.00266) (0.0245) (0.0171)
Other Two Member Avg Contribution -0.0215*** -0.0209*** -0.0618* -0.0500**
(0.00361) (0.00354) (0.0357) (0.0236)
GDP per cap. (Municipality) -0.00290 -0.0232
(0.00629) (0.0346)
Holistic Thinking -0.165* -0.0594
(0.0865) (0.286)
From Rural (Dummy) -0.00259 0.516**
(0.0474) (0.218)
Relative Income -0.0102 -0.129
(0.0344) (0.143)
Risk Attitude 0.0141 0.175**
(0.00995) (0.0861)
Male -0.0301 0.260
(0.0325) (0.204)
Natural Science (Dummy) -0.0232 0.316
(0.0383) (0.198)
Priming (Dummy) 0.0973** 0.0667
(0.0457) (0.234)
Single Child (Dummy) -0.0152 0.313
(0.0400) (0.277)
Collectivistic -0.0262 0.170
(0.0452) (0.341)
Individualistic 0.0801* 0.469**
(0.0479) (0.211)
Trustworthy (Belief) 0.00188 -0.000822
(0.0114) (0.0566)
Public Order (Belief) -0.00696 -0.0145
(0.00838) (0.0507)
Period 0.0228 0.0660 0.0644 -0.335 -0.188 -0.343
(0.0644) (0.0627) (0.0626) (0.230) (0.242) (0.250)
Period Squared -0.00158 -0.00312 -0.00306 0.0110 0.00593 0.0118
(0.00259) (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00957) (0.0101) (0.0100)
Constant 0.329 0.254 0.189 4.274*** 3.441** 1.210
(0.385) (0.392) (0.428) (1.422) (1.467) (1.449)
Observations 3985 3985 3985 1156 1156 1156
Notes: Columns 1-3 are Random Effects Linear Probability models and the dependent variable is the probability of
punishing Free-rider and Cooperators. Columns 4-6 are tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the amount
of punishment points assigned to other group member who contributed more or less than the punisher. Cluster
Standard errors (PGG group level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Thank	you	for	participating.		
Please note that communication with other participants is prohibited during the 
study. If you have a question once the study has begun, please raise your hand 
and an assistant will come to your desk to answer it. Violation of this rule can lead 
to immediate exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
Today we will do 5 studies. The instructions for the first study are attached. Once 
a study is completed, you will receive instructions for the next study. 
During the study we will not speak in terms of GBP, but in points. Your entire 
earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the study the total amount of 
points you have earned will be converted to RMB at the following rate: 
1 point = 0.4 GBP 
At the end of today’s study, one out of 5 study will be randomly selected for 
payment. After you completed all the studies, a card will be drawn from a bag, 
containing cards numbered from 1 to 5. The number on the card determines 
which study is for payment. 
You will receive GBP 4 as a show-up fee for participating. Therefore, your total 
earning is: 
Total Earning = Show-up fee + money you earned in the randomly chosen study 
Please read the instructions carefully, because your earnings in each study 
depends on how well you understand the instructions. 
Instructions for the First Study 
In this study, first you will be assigned a role. You will be either a Proposer or a 
Responder. If you are a Proposer, you will be randomly and anonymously paired 
with a Responder. If you are a Responder, you will be randomly and anonymously 
paired with a Proposer. This way, half of the people in the room will be Proposers 
and half of them will be Responders. 
DECISION OF PROPOSER 
The Proposer’s role is to allocate a total of 60 points between the Proposer and 
Responder. The input screen for the Proposer is presented below: 
The Proposer needs to use the slider to allocate points between him or her and 
the Responder. The more points the Proposer allocates to the Responder the less 
points he or she keeps. The amount of points allocated to the Responder as well 
as the points remaining for the Proposer are both shown on the screen. 
DECISION OF RESPONDER 
In the current study the responder can only accept the allocation made by the 
Proposer. In other words, the allocation made by the Proposer is implemented 
regardless of whether the Responder agrees or disagrees. 
 
 
EARNINGS 
The Proposer and the Responder receive the amount according to the allocation 
made by the Proposer. 
 
 
Control questions 
1. Suppose the Proposer allocated 20 points to the responder. 
What are the earnings for the Proposer?........ 
What are the earnings for the Responder?........ 
What can the Responder do if he/she is not satisfied with the allocation? ………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Suppose the Proposer allocated 40 points to the responder. 
What is the earnings for the Proposer?........ 
What is the earnings for the Responder?........ 
What can the Responder do if he/she is not satisfied with the allocation? ………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Instructions for the Second Study 
This study is very similar to the previous one.  
Your role in this study remains the same as in the previous study. If you were a 
Proposer, you will also be a Proposer in this one. If you were a Responder, you will 
also be a Responder in this one. 
Again . If you are a Proposer, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with 
a Responder. If you are a Responder, you will be randomly and anonymously 
paired with a Proposer. This way, half of the people in the room will be Proposers 
and half of them will be Responders. Your pair in this study need not be the same 
as in the previous study. 
DECISION OF PROPOSER 
The decision of the Proposer is exactly the same as in the previous study. The 
Proposer needs to allocate a total of 60 points between the Proposer and the 
Responder. In this study, the Responder can accept or reject the offer. 
NEW IN STUDY 2: DECISION OF RESPONDER 
Responders need to enter the minimum acceptance amount while the Proposers 
are making their decisions. The minimum acceptance amount is a number such 
that if the Proposer allocates a number less than the minimum acceptance 
amount, the allocation will be automatically rejected. On the other hand, if the 
Proposer allocates a number more or equal to the minimum acceptance 
amount, the allocation will be automatically accepted. For example, if a 
Responder stated 20 as the minimum acceptance amount and the Proposer 
allocates 19 or less to the Responder, then the allocation is automatically 
rejected. If the Proposer allocates 20 or more points to the Responder, then the 
allocation is automatically accepted. Important, Responders and Proposers are 
making decisions simultaneously. Therefore, Proposers will NOT know Responders’ 
minimum acceptance amount while making the allocation. Similarly, Responders 
will NOT know Proposers’ allocation while entering minimum acceptance 
amount. 
While Proposers are making decisions, Responders need to enter a number 
between 0 and 60. This number is called the “Minimum Acceptance Amount.” If 
the points that Proposer allocated to Responder are less than this “Minimum 
Acceptance Amount”, Proposer’s allocation will be automatically rejected. On 
the other hand, if the points that Proposer allocated to Responder are more or 
equal to this “Minimum Acceptance Amount”, Proposer’s allocation will be 
automatically accepted. For example, if a Responder stated 20 as the minimum 
acceptance amount and the Proposer allocates 19 or less to the Responder, then 
the allocation is automatically rejected. If the Proposer allocates 20 or more points 
to the Responder, then the allocation is automatically accepted. Important, 
Responders and Proposers are making decisions simultaneously. Therefore, 
Proposers will NOT know Responders’ minimum acceptance amount while 
making the allocation. Similarly, Responders will NOT know Proposers’ allocation 
while entering minimum acceptance amount. 
 
The input screen for the Responder is presented below. 
EARNINGS 
If the allocation made by Proposer is accepted, both receives the points 
allocated to them. 
If the allocation made by Proposer is rejected, both receive zero points. 
 
Please answer the questions in the next page. They serve as a test for you 
understanding of the task. 
 
Control questions 
1. Suppose the Proposer allocated 20 points to the Responder. 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 15, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 45, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
2. Suppose the Proposer allocated 40 points to the responder. 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 15, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
If Responder enter the minimal acceptance amount 45, what is the earnings for 
the Proposer?...... 
What are the earnings for the Responder?...... 
	
Instructions for the Third Study 
In this study, participants are randomly divided into groups of two. You will 
therefore be in a group with another participant.  
DECISIONS 
You and the other participant in your group need to pick one out of two possible 
choices simultaneously. The choices are labelled @ and #. When you make your 
choice you will not know what the other participant will choose. The other 
participant will not know your choice either. In other words, no participant will 
know what action the other player chose when making a decision. 
EARNINGS 
The following table shows earning for all possible combination of choices made 
by you and the other participant in your group. 
 
	 	 Other's	Choice	
	 	 @	 #	
Your	
Choice	
@	 (30, 30) (10, 22) 
#	 (22, 10) (22, 22) 
 
Note that, the numbers that are Bolded in each cell are earnings for you. The 
other number in each cell indicates the earning for the other participant. 
For example, suppose your choice is “@” and the other’s choice is “#”, then the 
earning are (10, 22). Therefore, you earn 10 points and the other participant earns 
22 points. If you choose “#” and the other's choice is “#”, then the earning are 
(22, 22). Therefore, you earn 22 points and the other participant earns 22 points 
too. 
Keep in mind: You and the other participant make your choices simultaneously 
without knowing what the other participant chooses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control questions: 
1. Suppose you choose @ and the other participant choose @. 
What is the earning for you?...... 
What is the earning for the other participant?...... 
 
2. Will you know what the other participant chose when you chose? …. 
Will the other participant know what you chose once he or she choses? … 
 
3. Suppose you earn 22 and the other participant earn 10. 
What was your choice?...... 
What was the other participant's choice?...... 
 
Instructions for the Fourth Study 
In this study, participants are randomly divided into groups of four. You will 
therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. You will remain in the same 
group for the duration of this study. There will be a total of 6 periods, each 
participant will face the same decision in each period. 
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives 20 points. We call this 
your endowment. In each period you will be asked to decide how many points 
of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group Account. You may allocate 
any integer number of points between 0 and 20. The remainder of your 
endowment will be automatically allocated to your Individual Account. The input 
screen is presented below: 
You can use the slide bar to decide how many points of your endowment you 
want to allocate to the Group Account. The amount allocated to your Private 
Account is also shown on the screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
EARNINGS 
After all the participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period 
are calculated. Your earnings consist of two parts: 
Your earnings from the Individual Account equal the points that you keep for 
yourself, and are thus independent of others’ decisions. For every point you keep 
for yourself in your Individual Account, you earn 1 point. 
Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total number of points 
allocated to the Group Account by the 4 group members (including yourself). This 
total amount is multiplied by 1.6 and then distributed equally amongst the four 
group members – each member receives a quarter of it (25%). In other words, 
each point that you allocate to the Group Account turns into 1.6 points, which 
are distributed equally to four members i.e. 0.4 points each. 
 
So, for each point that you or any of your group members allocate to the Group 
Account, you and the other three group members receive 0.4 points each. 
In summary, your earnings in each period are calculated as follows: 
Example: Suppose in one period that you allocated 8 points to the Group 
Account and that the other three members of your group allocated a total of 22 
points. This makes a total of 30 points in the Group Account. In this case each 
member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×30 = 12 
points. In addition, you also receive 12 points from your Individual Account. 
Therefore, your earning in this period is: (20 – 8) + 0.4 x 30 = 24 points. 
 
 
 
(1) Your earnings from the Individual Account. 
 
(2) Your earnings from the Group Account. 
   Your earnings =  
 
   Earnings from Individual Account + Earnings from the Group Account =  
 
   20 - (Your allocation to the Group account) + 0.4 x (Total points allocated 
to Group Account by all group members) 
RESULTS SCREEN 
After all your group members have made their decision, your allocation and the 
sum of all allocations in your group are reported on the Result Screen as shown 
below. To aid you in your calculation, your earnings from your individual account 
and your earnings from the group account are both presented on the screen. 
Please press the Continue button after you have read all the information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SCREEN 
Next the information screen appears, which reveals the contributions of the 
other group members. 
This screen shows how many points each group member allocated to the Group 
Account. Your allocation is displayed in the first column, while the allocations 
made by the other group members are shown in the remaining three columns. 
Please note that the order in which other group member’s allocations are 
displayed changes randomly in every period. The allocation in the second 
column, for example, generally represents a different group member each time. 
The same holds true for the allocations in the other columns. That way you are 
informed about the contributions but not about the identities of the other group 
members. 
A new period will start shortly after pressing the Continue button. You will again 
receive 20 points as endowment and you will be asked again to decide how 
many points of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group Account. 
If this study is randomly chosen for payment, we will randomly pick 1 period out 
of the 6 periods and your payments will be calculated by your decisions in that 
period 
Please answer the questions in the next page. They serve as a test for your 
understanding of the task.
Control questions 
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Suppose nobody 
(including you) contributes any points to the Group Account. What is: 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Other group members earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Other group members earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Other group members total earnings?........... 
 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Suppose you contribute 
8 points to the Group Account. All other group members each contribute 12 
points to the Group Account. What are: 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Other group members earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Other group members earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Other group members total earnings?........... 
 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Suppose the other three 
group members contribute a total of 30 points to the Group Account. 
 
a) If you contribute 5 points to the Group Account. 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Other group members earnings from the Group Account?........... 
 
 
b) What are your earning if you contribute 15 points to the Group Account? 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account?........... 
Your earnings from the Individual Account?........... 
Your total earnings?............. 
Instructions for the Fifth (Last) Study 
 
This study is similar to the previous study. First you will be randomly divided into a 
new group of four. The new group composition will not change throughout this 
study. 
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 10 Points at the beginning of 
this study. This one-off payment can be used to pay for eventual losses during this 
study. However, you can always evade losses with certainty through your own 
decisions.  
This study consists of 10 periods and there are 2 stages in each period. The first 
stage is identical to the previous study. At the beginning of each period each 
participant receives 20 points as his or her endowment. You need to decide how 
many points of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group Account (and 
hence the remainder of your endowment will be automatically allocated to your 
Individual Account). Your earnings from the first stage will be calculated exactly 
in the same way as in the previous part. 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 
There will be a new second stage introduced after all participants have made 
their decisions in the first stage. 
At the second stage you can observe how many points each group member 
allocated to the Group Account. In addition, in this stage you can decrease the 
earning of each group member by assigning deduction tokens to him/her. If you 
do not want to decrease the other’s earning, you simply do not assign any 
deduction tokens to him/her. Note that other group members can also decrease 
your earnings if they wish to do so. 
The input screen for the second stage is presented below: 
 
 
   Your earnings from the First Stage =  
 
   Earnings from Individual Account + Earnings from the Group Account =  
 
   20 - (Your allocation to the Group account) + 0.4 x (Total points allocated 
to Group Account by all group members) 
 The screen shows how many points each group member allocated to the Group 
Account at the first stage. Your allocation is displayed in the first column, while the 
allocations made by the others are shown in the remaining three columns. Please 
note that the order in which allocations are displayed changes randomly in every 
period. The allocation in the second column, for example, generally represents a 
different group member each time. The same holds true for the other columns. 
This way you are informed about the contributions but not about the identities of 
the other group members. 
You now have to decide whether, and if so how many, deduction tokens to assign 
to each of the other three group members. If you do not wish to change the 
income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. If you want to 
distribute deduction tokens, you must put a negative sign in front of the number 
(without spaces between them). 
You can assign between 0 and 10 deduction tokens to each group member. 
However, each deduction token costs you 1 point. Therefore, the larger the 
amount of deduction tokens that you assign to other group members, the larger 
your costs. The total cost of assigning deduction tokens is calculated as follows: 
 You can move from one input field to the other using the mouse. 
Example: If you assign 2 deduction tokens to one member (enter -2), assign 8 
deduction tokens to another member (enter -8), and you assign 0 deduction 
token to the last group member (enter 0), the sum of assigned deduction tokens 
is 2 + 9 + 0 = 11 and the total cost is 11 x 1 = 11 points. 
Each deduction token assigned to a participant reduces his/her earnings by 3 
points. A participant’s total received deduction tokens equal the sum of 
deduction tokens other group members assigned to him/her. Consequently, the 
amount of earnings decreased by the received deduction tokens is calculated 
as follows: 
Important: By receiving deduction tokens, each participant’s earning can only be 
reduced to ZERO. 
Example: If a participant received 2 deduction token from one group member, 9 
deduction tokens from another group member, and 0 deduction token from the 
last group member, then the participant received a total of 2 + 9 + 0 = 11 
deduction tokens. Consequently, his/her earnings will be decreased by 11 * 3 = 
33 points. If this participant earned 40 points in the First Stage, then his/her earnings 
will be 40 – 33 = 7 points. If this participant earned less than 33 in the First Stage, 
his/her earning will only be reduced to 0 point. It is possible that one can earn a 
negative amount: if your earnings were reduced to ZERO by receiving deduction 
tokens and you distributed 5 deduction tokens to others, your final earnings will be 
0 – 5 = -5 points. However, you can always evade losses with certainty through 
your own decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
   Total amount of earnings decreased by received deduction tokens = Sum 
of received deduction tokens x 3 
   Total cost of assigning deduction tokens = Sum of assigned deduction 
tokens x 1 
EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions in the second stage, your earnings 
for the period are calculated.  
The earnings from the First Stage are the same as in the previous part. These are 
the earnings from your Individual Account and the earnings from the Group 
Account. 
The earnings from the Second Stage depend on the total deduction tokens you 
assigned to other group members as well as the total deduction tokens you 
received from other group members. 
In sum, your earnings in each period are calculated as follows: 
Please remember that your earnings at the end of the second stage can be 
negative, if the cost of your points used to distribute deduction tokens exceeds 
your (possibly reduced) income from the first stage. You can however avoid such 
losses with certainty through your own decisions! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your earnings at the end of the second stage  = income per period 
 
=  Earnings in the First stage 
 － (Sum of deduction tokens received from other participants x 3) 
－ (Sum of deduction tokens assigned to other participants) 
 
RESULTS SCREEN 
At the end of the second stage, your allocation and the sum of all allocations in 
your group are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. The sum of 
deduction tokens you assigned to others as well as the sum of deduction tokens 
you received are also presented on the screen. 
 
Please press the Continue button after you have read all the information. A new 
period will start shortly. 
If this study is randomly chosen for payment, we will randomly pick 1 period out of 
the 10 periods and your payments will be calculated by your decisions in that 
period 
Please answer the questions in the next page. They serve as a test for you 
understanding of the task.
Control questions 
1. Suppose at the second stage you assign the following deduction tokens to your 
three other group members: -9, -5, and 0. What is  the total cost of your assigned 
deduction tokens?........... 
 
2. What is your cost if you assign a total of 0 points?........... 
 
3. Suppose you earn 10 points in the First stage. By how many points will your 
income from the first stage be reduced if you receive a total of 1 deduction 
tokens from the other group members?........... 
 
4. Suppose you earn 20 points in the First stage. By how many points will your 
income from the first stage be reduced if you receive a total of 5 deduction 
tokens from the other group members?........... 
 
5. Suppose you earn 30 points in the First stage. If you received 1 deduction token 
and assigned a total of 5 deduction tokens. What are your final 
earnings?.................. 
 
6. Suppose you earn 20 points in the First stage. If you received 7 deduction tokens 
and assigned a total of 5 deduction tokens. What are your final 
earnings?.................. 
 
7. Suppose you earn 10 points in the First stage. If you received 2 deduction tokens 
and assigned a total of 8 deduction tokens. What are your final 
earnings?.................. 
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General instructions for participants 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Please note that it is prohibited to communicate with other participants 
during the study. If you have a question once the study has begun, please 
raise your hand and an assistant will come to your desk to answer it. Violation 
of this rule leads to immediate exclusion from the study and from all 
payments. 
You will never learn the identity of the other participants, neither before nor 
after the study; and none of the other participants will learn anything about 
your identity.  
You will receive 200 Rand for participating in this session. The study consists of 
4 parts (“Part I”, “Part II”, etc.), each involving a simple decision task, note 
that you cannot earn money for yourself in all 4 parts. 
 
Your payment = 200 Rand 
 
 
In what follows we describe the procedure for Part I in which no additional 
earnings for yourself are possible. 
 
 
  
Part I 
This part is similar to a “Run for charity” event. Instead of running you can 
solve some tasks and the more tasks you solve the more we donate to a 
charity of your choice. At the end of the study the supervisor will make an 
online donation to your chosen charity. Thus, the amount of money that you 
raise for the charity depends on your success in solving the tasks. Note, that 
you cannot earn any money for yourself in this part. 
Note, earlier studies have shown that people can solve 19 tasks with little 
effort, and can solve 26 or more tasks with reasonable effort. 
  
Below is the detailed description of the task: 
The tasks that you are asked to solve are called “Find the T’s”. When the task 
starts, a page full of symbols will appear on your computer screen. There are 
just two different symbols on the screen, one is “+”, the other is more similar to 
the letter “T”. 
                       
In each task you need to find all the “T”s. Each task contains 20 “T”s in total. 
To select a “T” you simply left click with the mouse on the T.  The “T”s that you 
selected will be highlighted in red. After you have found all of the “Ts” a new 
screen with new symbols will appear on your screen. 
You have a total of 20 minutes to solve tasks. Note that this does not mean 
you need to solve tasks all the time. You can stop at any time by pressing the 
“STOP” button that is present on each screen. After pressing the stop button, 
you are given a choice to either continue solving the task (but there would be 
NO more money generated for the charity) or to stop this task completely. 
  
The more tasks you solve the more is transferred to your chosen charity. The 
amount per solved task that is transferred to the charity decreases over time. 
Here is the list of donations that can be achieved: 
Task 1:  3250 cents (=32.50 Rand) 
Task 2: 1562 cents 
Task 3: 1020 cents 
Task 4: 729 cents 
Task 5: 562 cents 
Task 6: 458 cents 
Task 7: 375 cents 
Task 8: 312 cents 
Task 9: 271 cents 
Task 10: 229 cents 
Task 11: 208 cents 
Task 12: 167 cents 
Task 13: 146 cents 
Task 14: 146 cents 
Task 15: 125 cents 
Task 16: 104 cents 
Task 17: 104 cents 
Task 18: 83 cents 
Task 19: 83 cents 
Task 20 onwards: 63 cents 
 
Your total donation will depend on the Total number of tasks solved. To 
calculate the total donation you simply need to add up the achieved 
donations of all solved tasks. 
For example if you solved task 1 – 3, your donation will be: 
3250 + 1562 + 1020 = 5832 cents = 58.32 Rand 
If the tasks ends and you have not yet completed a given task the donation is 
calculated proportionally. This means that if you for example found 10 of the 
20 Ts in task 6 your donation from task 6 will be half of the normal donation 
that is 229 cents instead of 458 cents. This means that no effort is lost when you 
stop the task or the time is up. 
After 20 minutes or after pressing the “STOP” button, you can choose to which 
charity you would like the money to be sent that you raised.  
 
  
Important rule: 
It is important that you only click on the “Ts” and not on the “+” symbol.  The 
reason is that if you click 4 times on a “+” symbol all Ts found so far in a task 
are deselected. That is you need to restart this task again. It does however not 
affect the previously solved tasks. The number of mistakes in a task does not 
carry on to the next task. That is, once you complete a task, the number of 
mistakes is reset to zero. The total number of mistakes is shown at the bottom 
of the screen. 
Solving a task means that you need to find all the “T”s on that task. For 
example, if you are on task 26 and find less than 20 “T”s, this means that you 
did NOT solve 26 tasks but only solved 25 tasks. 
 
Please choose one of the following charities. A brief description of each 
charity can be found on the next pages. 
O Lifeline O World Wildlife Fund (WWF) South Africa 
O The South African Guide 
Dogs Association 
O Students' Health and Welfare Centers 
Organization 
O Project Literacy O The Sunflower Fund 
O AIDS Foundation SA O Rape Crisis 
O Save the Rhino O Food & Trees for Africa (FTFA) 
O St Luke’s Hospice O Southern African Foundation for the 
Conservation of Coastal Birds 
O Nazareth House Cape Town O Ihata Women’s Shelter 
 
Please feel free to ask questions at any point if you feel you need clarification. 
Please do so by raising your hand. 
  
Control Questions 
1. Suppose you finished Task 1 and you found 10 Ts on Task 2 and then you 
press the “Stop” button. 
 
How many Ts you did you find in total? ………………… 
 
How much money will you donate to the chosen charity? ……………….. 
 
2. Suppose you have already found 6 Ts on a Task. Now you make several 
mistakes. What happens if you make … 
… 3 mistakes? ………………………………………………………………….. 
 
… 4 mistakes? ………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Suppose you made 3 mistakes on Task 1. Now you are working on Task 
2. How many mistakes you are allowed to make on Task 2? 
 
…………………………. 
4. It is possible to solve the tasks without generating any money for the  
   charity?           ………………………………………………………………… 
     
      If yes, how can you do this? ……………………………………………………. 
……………………………………....…………………………………………………. 
  
Part II 
In the second part, everything is the same as in part I except that we will 
publicly announce the seat number of those who solved 26 tasks or more. 
Please note: because we are interested in why people donate in general, we 
will communicate the total amount raised by the group in this room at the 
end. We will ask those of you who solved 26 or more tasks to stand up. We will 
briefly acknowledge your efforts. 
Important: We will not identify people with names, only with their seat number, 
which you find on the cubicle wall, and the amount donated. We will also not 
mention the charity people have chosen. 
Remember: Solving a task means that you need to find all the “T”s on that 
task. For example, if you are on task 26 and find less than 20 “T”s, this means 
that you did NOT solve 26 tasks but only solved 25 tasks.  
 
 
A. Appendix to Chapter 4
A Appendix to Chapter 4
A.1 Response to Different Pay Levels
Figure A.1: How Subjects Respond to Different Pay Levels
Notes: This figure illustrates that subjects on average put more effort when the pay level is higher. Importantly,
subject’s response to the different pay level is similar between the self condition and the donation condition. This
implies that subject’s behavior is rational when they cannot earn money for themselves.
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Thank you for participating in this study. 
Please note that communication with other participants is prohibited during 
the study. If you have a question once the study has begun, please raise your 
hand and an assistant will come to your desk to answer it. Violation of this rule 
can lead to immediate exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
Today, we will do two studies. The instructions for the first study are attached. 
The instructions for the second study will be provided upon completion of the 
first study. Payment of any earnings from either study will be made at the end 
of the second study, before you leave. 
  
  
Instructions for the First Study 
You will receive £8 as a show-up fee for participating in the first study. 
The first study consists of two parts (“Part I” and “Part II”). Each part involves 
one simple task in which you can generate money that the experimenter will 
donate to a charity of your choice. 
At the end, all participants will gather at the exit, and, after having signed a 
receipt, will receive their total payment (from both studies) in an envelope.  
Furthermore, we will add your name to a list of all participants of this study. 
This list will be publicly viewable in the corridor outside of this room. 
Please select one of the charities below. All donations generated by you will 
be given to your chosen charity. A brief description of each charity can be 
found on the next pages. 
o Cancer Research UK o ChildLine 
o Oxfam o The Guide Dogs for the Blind Assoc 
o Greenpeace International o World Wildlife Fund (WWF) UK 
o British Red Cross o RHUL: Scholarships & Bursaries 
o British Heart Foundation o Royal Soc. for the Protection of Birds 
 
In the following we speak of points that you can donate to the charity. The 
points will be translated into money for the charity according to the following 
exchange rate: 
100 points = 2 pence 
In what follows we describe the procedure for Part I. 
  
  
Part I: Click for Charity 
This part is similar to a “Run for Charity” event, but instead of running, you click 
(with the LEFT BUTTON of your computer mouse). The more clicks you make, 
the more we will donate to a charity of your choice. We call this “Click for 
Charity.” 
There will be 12 rounds, each following the same pattern. 
Each round begins with a screen showing a “+” symbol. It indicates that the 
task will begin soon. No action is required. 
After a short time, a new screen will appear. This screen will show how many 
points each click is worth in this round.  
The amount of money you can generate for the charity of your choice is not 
the same for all rounds. In some rounds, one click is worth 1 point, in others 10 
points. 
There are a total of 4 different levels: 1, 3, 6, or 10 points per click. Level 1 
means that in the current round, each click is worth 1 point. Similarly, level 3 
means that in the current round, each click is worth 3 points. 
  
When you are ready, please press the space bar. 
You will then see a short countdown from 3 to 1. After the countdown, a 
square symbol will appear, indicating that the clock has started. You now 
have exactly 30 seconds available for clicking. Remember to use the LEFT 
mouse button for clicking. 
When the time is up, the current round ends. A new screen will appear, 
showing ‘end of round’. After a short moment, you will see the screen with the 
“+” symbol again, and the next round begins. 
There will be 12 rounds in total, and 4 different levels, meaning that you will 
perform 3 rounds for each level. The sum from all rounds will constitute the 
amount that will be donated to the charity of your choice. 
Important: The total amount of your donation and the charity you choose will 
be kept confidential. Likewise, you will not be informed of anybody else’s 
total donation. 
 
Important: You cannot earn money for yourself in this part of the study. 
 
We will ask you to put on the headset on your desk and listen to classical 
music during the clicking phase. This is to minimise the distraction from other 
participants. 
 
Practice rounds 
You will do 4 practice rounds before you begin with the actual task. You can 
use these rounds to try out which clicking technique works best for you. 
All the different levels will appear once, so you can get used to the task. 
Please note: No money will be generated for the charity in the practice 
rounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Control Questions 
 
1. Do your earnings for this part depend on the number of clicks? 
☐ yes  ☐ no 
 
2. Does your donation to the charity depend on the number of clicks? 
☐ yes  ☐ no 
 
3. Suppose in one round you clicked 50 times and each click is worth 3 
points. How many points did you donate to the charity in that round? 
………..  points 
 
4. Suppose in one round you clicked 50 times and each click is worth 10 
points. How many points did you donate to the charity in that round? 
………..  points 
 
5. Fill in in the gaps. 
Each click can be worth …… , ……. , …….. , or ……. points 
 
6. How many rounds are there in this part? 
………..  rounds 
 
7. How many seconds does one round last? 
………..  seconds 
 
 
  
Part II: Click for Charity 
Part II is another “Click for Charity” event. It is very similar to Part I. As in Part I, 
the more clicks you make, the more we will donate to the charity you have 
already chosen. Again, you cannot earn money for yourself in this part of the 
study. The differences to Part I are explained below. 
 
Important: When everybody is gathered around to receive their payment, the 
two individuals who produced the highest donations in this part will sign their 
receipts on yellow paper and will receive their payment in yellow envelopes. 
Everybody else will sign receipts on white paper and receive their payment in 
white envelopes. 
Furthermore, the names of the two individuals who produced the highest 
donations will be highlighted on the participant list. As mentioned earlier, this 
list will be publicly viewable in the corridor outside of this room. The list will not 
include any other information on the amounts donated, nor which charities 
have been chosen. 
 
Only the donations achieved in Part II will count towards determining the 
individuals who produced the two highest donations. 
 
  
Instructions for the Second Study 
 
The second study is a “Click for Yourself” event. The task is the same as in the 
first study. However, the more clicks you make, the more points you will earn 
for yourself. Thus, no charity will benefit from your performance, only you. 
The points will be translated into money for you according to the same 
exchange rate as in the first study: 
100 points = 2 pence 
 
Hence, your total payment will be calculated as follows: 
 
Your payment =  £8 (show-up fee from the first study) 
     + any amount earned in the second study 
 
Your earnings in the second study will remain completely confidential: No 
information will be shared on who earned much or little in the second study, 
let alone any specific amounts. 
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